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Suzanne B. Goldberg

Discrimination by Comparison
abstract. Contemporary discrimination law is in crisis, both methodologically and
conceptually. The crisis arises in large part from the judiciary’s dependence on comparators—
those who are like a discrimination claimant but for the protected characteristic—as a favored
heuristic for observing discrimination. The profound mismatch of the comparator methodology
with current understandings of identity discrimination and the realities of the modern workplace
has nearly depleted discrimination jurisprudence and theory. Even in run-of-the-mill cases,
comparators often cannot be found, particularly in today’s mobile, knowledge-based economy.
This difficulty is amplified for complex claims, which rest on thicker understandings of
discrimination developed in second-generation intersectionality, identity performance, and
structural discrimination theories. By treating comparators as an essential element of
discrimination, instead of as a heuristic device to help discern whether discrimination has
occurred, courts have largely foreclosed these other theories from consideration. At the same
time, courts have further shrunk the very idea of discrimination by disregarding a central lesson
from harassment and stereotyping jurisprudence: discrimination can occur without a comparator
present. The comparator methodology retains its appeal, despite these deficiencies, because its
empirical patina permits courts to evaluate discrimination claims without appearing to engage in
a subjective analysis of workplace dynamics. Given the complex nature of both identity and
discrimination, however, the comparisons produce a false certainty at best. By contrast, alternate
methodologies, including the contextual consideration favored in harassment and stereotyping
jurisprudence as well as the hypothetical comparator embraced in European law, offer a
meaningful framework for matching discrimination law and norms to workplace facts, while
preserving judicial legitimacy. With comparators dislodged from their methodological pedestal,
we may yet recover space for the renewed development of discrimination jurisprudence and
theory.

author. Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to Henry Monaghan,
Susan Sturm, and Elizabeth Emens for extended conversations, as well as to Carlos Ball, George
Bermann, Mary Anne Case, Robert Ferguson, Katherine Franke, Julie Goldscheid, Kent
Greenawalt, Scott Hemphill, John Leubsdorf, Lance Liebman, Martha Minow, Joseph Raz,
Elizabeth Scott, Robert Scott, Charles Sullivan, and Kendall Thomas, as well as participants in
faculty workshops at Columbia, the City University of New York, Hofstra, and Vanderbilt Law
Schools, and the Washington College of Law at American University. Thanks also to J. Taylor
Kirklin, Amy McCamphill, David Pennington, and Mai Ratakonda for excellent research
assistance.
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discrimination by comparison

introduction
Contemporary discrimination law is in the midst of a crisis of
methodological and conceptual dimensions. The underlying problem is that
evaluating allegations of discrimination requires courts and others to see
something that is not observable directly: whether an accused discriminator
has acted because of a protected characteristic. While this challenge has long
been with us, as putative discriminators rarely admit discriminatory intent,1 the
crisis arises because the most traditional and widely used heuristic—
comparators, who are similar to the complainant in all respects but for the
protected characteristic—is barely functional in today’s economy and is largely
unresponsive to updated understandings of discrimination.
Some decades ago, when identity-based differentiation was relatively open
and notorious and when many workplaces were of a Tayloresque scale with
easily comparable jobs,2 individuals claiming discrimination could often point
to counterparts who were treated better. Courts could then deduce, with some
confidence, that the protected trait was the reason for the adverse treatment at
issue.3 But in a mobile, knowledge-based economy, actual comparators are

1.

2.

3.

See, e.g., Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title
VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1207 (2003) (recognizing
that as soon as Title VII became law, “no sensible employer would admit that it based a
decision on one of the prohibited classifications”).
See FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911). For
further discussion, see infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
In this sense, the comparator is used to show causation—that the challenged acts occurred
because of the protected trait and would not have occurred absent impermissible reliance on
that trait. The causation determination is necessary because one of the central inquiries in a
discrimination case is whether the challenged acts were “because of” a protected
characteristic. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, for example, that “[i]t shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis
added); see also 29 U.S.C. § 623a-1 (2006) (forbidding, through the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, adverse employment actions “because of such individual’s age” (emphasis
added)).
To decide a disparate treatment claim under these and similar laws, a court must
determine “whether the employer is treating ‘some people less favorably than others because
of’” any of these characteristics. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)
(quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). While
comparators are not statutorily required to make this determination, courts have come to
treat them, in many cases, as essential to showing the requisite discriminatory intent. See
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60
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hard to come by, even for run-of-the-mill discrimination claims.4 For the
complex forms of discrimination made legible by second-generation theories,
the difficulties in locating a comparator amplify exponentially.5
This methodological problem has spilled over, conceptually, to constrict
the very idea of discrimination. Consider Justice Thomas’s statement that a
finding of discrimination cannot be made without “a comparison of otherwise
similarly situated persons who are in different groups by reason of certain
characteristics provided by statute.”6 Justice Kennedy has observed similarly
that “one who alleges discrimination must show that she ‘received differential
treatment vis-à-vis members of a different group on the basis of a statutorily
described characteristic.’”7 On this view, however abusively an employer treats
its employees, the bad acts do not present a discrimination problem so long as

ALA. L. REV. 191, 204-06 (2009) (observing that a similarly situated comparator is not
required by statute but that “the absence of a comparator is often fatal to a claim”). Further,
although the ultimate question whether a defendant employer acted because of a protected
characteristic is reserved for trial, courts regularly evaluate the link between the facts
presented and the protected characteristic in the course of deciding dispositive pretrial
motions. Disparate impact cases do not require a similar showing of discriminatory intent.
See infra Section III.C. In constitutional discrimination claims, by contrast, a showing of
discriminatory intent is always required. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(finding no legally cognizable claim of discrimination where a policy had a racially
disproportionate impact but there was no evidence of discriminatory intent).
The application of these doctrines and the related determinants of discrimination law’s
scope is also shaped, more generally, by views of discrimination law’s social, political, and
economic function. As Robert Post has observed, discrimination law is not actually
concerned with eradicating all trait-based acts but rather only a subset of acts that has been
socially disapproved. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2000).
4.

5.
6.
7.

732

The case of Wendy Norville is illustrative. Norville was a black nurse who alleged that the
hospital where she worked had discriminated against her by “refus[ing] to accommodate
her disability despite having made job accommodations for two disabled white nurses.”
Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999) (Sotomayor, J.).
Although Norville produced evidence about the better treatment of her white coworkers, she
lost her claim because she did not persuade the court that other nurses were “subject to the
same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, and . . . engaged in
conduct similar to [hers].” Id. at 96 (quoting Mazzella v. RCA Global Commc’ns Inc., 642
F. Supp. 1531, 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Opsatnik v.
Norfolk S. Corp., 335 F. App’x 220, 222 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting the district court’s rejection of
twenty-four proposed comparators).
See infra Section II.B.
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 617 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 611 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 616 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).

discrimination by comparison

they are committed in an evenhanded fashion.8 Their position, in essence, is
that discrimination laws and norms do not impose obligations with
meaningful abstract value.
Yet this position foreshortens traditional understandings of discrimination
even within the Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence. As the case law that
addresses harassment and stereotyping makes clear, objectionable trait-based
acts and statements occur in the absence of a comparator.9 Indeed, in a wellknown stereotyping case, the Court acknowledged the lower court’s finding
that no comparators existed, yet still found that the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins,
was discriminatorily denied partnership at her accounting firm.10 Likewise, in a
much-discussed harassment case, the Court unanimously recognized that
discrimination, in the form of sexual harassment, could occur in a work
environment where only men were present.11 At the same time, the Court has
acknowledged that the presence of a better-treated comparator does not
transform permissible acts into unlawful ones. “Treating seemingly similarly
situated individuals differently in the employment context is par for the
course,” Chief Justice Roberts recently wrote.12

8.

9.

10.
11.

12.

This view is echoed by courts that have concluded that “equal opportunity” harassers, those
who harass both men and women, do not violate sex discrimination prohibitions. See, e.g.,
Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a sex
discrimination claim because “[i]n its totality, the evidence compels the conclusion that [the
supervisor] was just . . . indiscriminately vulgar and offensive, . . . obnoxious to men and
women alike”); cf. Kathryn Abrams, Complex Claimants and Reductive Moral Judgments: New
Patterns in the Search for Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 337, 345 n.47 (1996) (describing “the
dominant ‘equality theory’ understandings that animate antidiscrimination law” as
comparative).
See infra Part IV. In conversation, Charles Sullivan has suggested that harassing acts and
stereotyping statements amount to an admission of discriminatory intent. As will be
elaborated below, I disagree with that contention, in part because employers ordinarily
defend these kinds of acts and statements as nondiscriminatory and the courts often
disagree with an employee’s contention that the specified speech or conduct reflects
discriminatory intent.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 236 (1989).
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). For discussion of other
circumstances in which an antidiscrimination norm may be violated absent an actual
comparator, including the possible role of a hypothetical comparator, see infra Section VI.B.
Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 604 (2008).
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Still, the scope of discrimination law continues to shrink.13 The judicial
demand for comparators continues largely unabated outside the harassment
and stereotyping contexts,14 sharply narrowing both the possibility of success
for individual litigants15 and, more generally, the very meaning of
discrimination.

13.

14.
15.

I develop this claim primarily through identity-discrimination cases brought under federal
employment discrimination laws rather than through cases that rest on constitutional equal
protection challenges, state law claims, or discrimination claims outside the employment
context. Yet, as will be elaborated, the analysis here is not limited to statutory prohibitions
against discrimination or to the employment context. Discrimination based on factors other
than identity, however, such as forms of economic discrimination addressed in antitrust law,
is beyond this Article’s scope. Still, some of the discussion below may be useful for the
conceptualization of discrimination in those areas as well.
See infra Part I.
On the dismal fate of most discrimination claimants, see Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 429, 444, 449-52 (2004). See also Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon
Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination
Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 176-77 (2010)
(concluding that employment discrimination plaintiffs “receive cursory attention in legal
process and a limited remedy” and that discrimination law “seldom offers an authoritative
resolution of whether discrimination occurred”). Employment discrimination plaintiffs who
prevail at trial lose on appeal forty-two percent of the time; judgments for employerdefendants are reversed in fewer than eight percent of cases. Clermont & Schwab, supra, at
450; see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts:
Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 958
(describing employment discrimination plaintiffs as “one of the least successful classes of
plaintiffs at the trial court level” as well as on appeal).
Individuals who present claims involving more than one aspect of their identity—such
as race and sex—fare even worse. Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at
Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439 (2009) (discussing disproportionately high loss
rates for individuals who bring complex discrimination claims). A new empirical study
reinforces that even when individuals do not bring claims based on “overlapping axes of
disadvantage,” their “demographic diversity” further reduces their likelihood of success in
discrimination litigation. Rachel Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of
Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. (forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 5) (on file with author).
Some scholars maintain that courts’ hostility toward discrimination claims is
ideologically based. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22-26 (2006) (asserting that courts resist a
structural approach to discrimination claims, in part, because many judges are ideologically
opposed to second-guessing decisions by employers); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment
Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 561-69 (2001) (arguing that
“courts approach cases from a particular perspective that reflects a bias against the claims”
and that this ideological bias colors how courts adjudicate discrimination claims). On this
view, the choice of the comparator heuristic, which narrows the set of discrimination claims
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In this Article, I argue that we are seeing the transformation of a heuristic
device16 for observing discrimination into a defining element of discrimination
and that this collapse presents two serious problems. First, methodologically,
comparators’ deficiencies have come to outweigh their strengths as devices for
discerning discrimination. Specifically, the demand for similarly situated,
better-treated others underinclusively misses important forms of
discrimination and forecloses many individuals from having even an
opportunity to be heard because sufficiently close comparators so rarely exist.17
The second problem is conceptual. Since the early 1990s, much of the
theoretical work on discrimination has attempted to make legible the many
ways in which discrimination occurs beyond the forms of easily recognizable,
deliberate exclusion that are based on relatively thin conceptions of protected
traits.18 Yet when comparators are treated as definitional, these theories cannot
gain jurisprudential traction because the problems they identify cannot, in
effect, be seen by courts.

16.

17.
18.

likely to succeed, as explained below, could be seen as both deliberate and in service of
ideologically motivated, outcome-oriented aims. Whether or not this is actually the reason
for courts’ embrace of the comparator heuristic, the lack of transparency and accountability
associated with the assumptions and judgments embedded in the heuristic’s selection
triggers the inquiries I pursue here.
For an extended discussion of heuristics, see SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE
POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 52-72
(2007). Page explains that heuristics are, in essence, thinking rules that generate solutions to
problems. Id. at 55. In discrimination cases, the critical factor—discriminatory intent—is
hidden from view, and the comparator heuristic works by reducing the set of likely
explanations for the adverse treatment that triggered the claim.
The term “heuristics” came to prominence in cognitive psychology during the 1970s
through the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who “posited that because
decisionmaking often involves an abundance of information, time pressures, and an array of
possible alternatives, people intuitively and unconsciously use cognitive shortcuts or
‘heuristics’ to make decisions about probabilities.” Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional
Thinking: The Heuristics Problem in Feminist Legal Theory, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 391, 395-96
(2006); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lecture, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1556, 1558 (2004) (analyzing the “pervasive role” that heuristics play in legal
judgments). See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
See infra Parts II & III.
See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). As will become apparent, first- and second-generation claims
are best understood as falling along a spectrum, rather than as sharply distinct. See infra Part
II.
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This Article considers three of the leading theories.19 The first is
intersectionality theory, which recognizes that although the law designates
trait-based protections sequentially, employers and others often target
individuals because of their identity as a whole, rather than because of
individual traits in isolation from one another.20 In these situations, an
employee, such as a black woman or a disabled older man, claims to have
experienced discrimination based on a combination of legally protected traits.
He or she struggles under a comparator regime in part because it can be
difficult to decide who is the proper comparator—is it someone who shares
neither of the individual’s traits or shares one but not the other? In addition,
because intersectional plaintiffs are often few in number relative to all others in
a workplace, decisionmakers tend to be skeptical of the comparison’s probative
value and are typically unwilling to conclude that comparatively worse
treatment is attributable to discriminatory intent rather than to the plaintiff’s
idiosyncratic quirks.
The second theory is identity performance, which conceives of identity
traits in a thick way, recognizing that individuals sometimes experience
discrimination because of stereotypes about behaviors or personal styles
associated with their identity group rather than because of their phenotype.
When operationalized, the theory produces cases in which employees and
others seek to show that they have suffered trait-based discrimination because
they have, for example, a Spanish-inflected accent or a traditionally African

19.

Later in the Article I also briefly address additional second-generation theories related to
implicit bias and other cognitive psychological research regarding discrimination. See infra
Section V.C.

20.

Intersectionality theory emerged in legal scholarship in the early 1990s. See, e.g., Kimberle
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243-44 (1991) (“[T]he experiences of women of
color are frequently the product of intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, and . . . tend
not to be represented within the discourses of either feminism or antiracism.”) (footnote
omitted); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 585 (1990) (characterizing and criticizing “gender essentialism—the notion that a
unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described independently of race,
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience”). More recent theory makes the
point that the relationship among multiple identity traits is better characterized as
multidimensional or cosynthetic, with traits interacting in both dominant and
subordinating ways depending on the surrounding context. As Darren Hutchinson has
written, “Multidimensionality theorists have attempted to move beyond intersectionality’s
antiessentialist roots by examining questions of ‘intersecting’ privilege and subordination—
rather than simply focusing on the lives of individuals, such as women of color, who are
excluded from ‘single-issue’ frameworks.” Darren Lenard Hutchinson, New Complexity
Theories: From Theoretical Innovation to Doctrinal Reform, 71 UMKC L. REV. 431, 435-36
(2002). For further discussion, see infra Section II.B.
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hairstyle.21 Yet a comparator-based approach misses identity-performance
theory’s point in all but the most limited circumstances. For example, we
might imagine an employer refusing to promote one Latino but promoting
several others and arguing that it was not ethnicity but personal style (that is,
too much Spanish-speaking or too thick an accent) that led to the promotion
denial. Unless there is a non-Latino comparator who speaks the same amount
of Spanish or has the same accent, the claim will not be legible in an analytic
regime that recognizes discrimination only in the presence of a better-treated
counterpart.22
The third is structural discrimination theory, which focuses on the ways in
which the structures and dynamics of workplaces and other environments can
effectuate—and obscure—discriminatory intent. Central to this theory are the
“patterns of interaction among groups within the workplace that, over time,
exclude nondominant groups” based on protected traits but are “difficult to
trace directly to intentional, discrete actions of particular actors.”23
Comparators, even if they exist, are unlikely to shed light on the identity traits

21.

See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1297-98,
1307-08 (2000). For further discussion, see infra Section II.B.

22.

See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the claim that
termination for speaking Spanish constituted national origin discrimination under Title
VII); Fragante v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596, 599 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding
that “[a]ccent and national origin are obviously inextricably intertwined in many cases” but
rejecting the plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim because of the “effect of his Filipino
accent on his ability to communicate”); Korpai v. A.W. Zengeler’s Grande Cleaners, Inc.,
No. 85 C 9130, 1987 WL 20428, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1987) (“Discrimination based on
foreign immigration and speech with an accent is not discrimination based upon Hungarian
ancestry or Hungarian characteristics, for purposes of Section 1981.”). But see Carino v.
Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1984) (upholding a determination
that the plaintiff suffered discrimination because of his national origin and related accent).
See generally Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the García Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product
of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 261 (1998)
(discussing the relationship of accent discrimination to race- and ethnicity-based
discrimination); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (analyzing accent
discrimination and the related application of antidiscrimination law). For further discussion
of identity performance theory, see infra notes 124-139.
Sturm, supra note 18, at 460; see also Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 623, 665 (2005) [hereinafter Green, Work Culture] (“[D]iscriminatory work
cultures are too complex and too intertwined with valuable social relations to be easily
regulated through judicial pronouncements and direct regulation of relational behavior.”).
See generally Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849 (2007) (describing and defending structural
discrimination theory).

23.
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that motivated the exclusionary interaction patterns in all but the most blatant
situations. The judicial insistence on comparators thus renders imperceptible
the link between the protected trait and the reduction in opportunities or
increase in adverse treatment.
Stepping back, we see that the comparator methodology has left these
theories virtually noncognizable in the adjudication context and, by doing so,
has depleted antidiscrimination norms of much of their content. Put another
way, the synergistic relationship between the law’s production of observational
tools and those tools’ production of law has put comparators in a position to
shape and limit what courts can see as discriminatory.
Several payoffs follow from this clarified picture of the comparator
methodology’s consequences. For one, by putting into stark relief how little
work discrimination law is doing in court, we can flesh out more of the story
behind the numerous empirical studies showing that discrimination plaintiffs
lose their cases at disproportionately high rates.24 That is, the mismatch
between the comparator heuristic and today’s work world helps make sense of
why so many discrimination plaintiffs lose their cases.
In addition, a more robust understanding of the comparator methodology’s
conceptual limitations prompts us to revisit Lon Fuller’s observations
regarding the forms and limits of adjudication,25 this time in the context of
discrimination law. Here we find a longstanding debate about whether
discrimination law already overreaches and, even if it does not, whether the
newer theories press it to do so.26 Some argue that because we are largely past

24.
25.

26.

738

See supra note 15.
Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). Fuller
defined adjudication as involving the “authoritative determination of questions raised by
claims of right and accusations of guilt” through the consideration of “proofs and reasoned
arguments,” id. at 368-69, and then focused on addressing adjudication’s limitations,
particularly in circumstances that required, for proper resolution, a managerial-style analysis
of polycentric and dynamic conflicts. To the extent that claims require these types of
analyses and judgments, which do not rest on proofs and reasoned argument, Fuller argued
that they demand more than reasonably can be asked of an adjudicator. Id. at 370-71.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 59-78 (1992) (objecting to discrimination laws because they interfere
with the efficiencies gained in a homogeneous work environment); John J. Donohue III,
Essay, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986) (maintaining that Title VII’s ban
on discrimination may maximize social welfare); Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in
the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 157 (2009) (discussing disagreements
regarding whether discrimination law prohibits the types of employer conduct captured by
structural discrimination theories); cf. Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford,
(How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053,

discrimination by comparison

the primordial phase of identity discrimination, with its overt or obvious
trait-based differentiations, a modified or new paradigm may be needed to
redress ongoing issues in the workplace.27 Others take the position that,
whatever one’s normative preferences, courts are simply not capable of
entertaining the complex, multifaceted forms of discrimination that the newer
theories elaborate.28 Still others maintain that discrimination law has much it
can do to address those whose identity-based injuries were missed by firstgeneration analyses.
Rather than join this debate directly, my interest here is in using the
clarified picture of comparator-centric analysis to gauge the possibilities and
limits for both adjudication and theory in this area, however thinly or thickly
identity-based protections are conceived. By shedding light on why the
methodology has had such sticking power notwithstanding its striking

1059 (2009) (“The unconscious bias discourse is as likely to subvert as to further the goal of
substantive racial justice.”).
27.
28.

See infra Section II.B.
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479,
2481 (1994) (describing the difficulty courts have in giving an account of complex cases
“that would help integrate such claims into the mainstream of Title VII doctrine”); Jonah
Gelbach, Jonathan Klick & Lesley Wexler, Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense
To Pay Too Little?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 800 (2010) (arguing that discrimination law does
not reach employers who design compensation packages to “avoid[] hiring individuals from
[a] disfavored group”); Susan Sturm, Equality and the Forms of Justice, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.
51, 54 (2003) (“[A]ny theory of discrimination that is sufficiently clear to provide
guidance . . . cannot deal adequately with the varied, complex, and shifting dynamics and
normative meaning of group-based discrimination.”); cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good
on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace
Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1900 (2009) (maintaining, with respect to unconscious
discrimination, that “[a]ggressive legal strategies” may “have a negative effect on people’s
internalization of nondiscrimination norms” and exacerbate rather than “reduc[e]
undesirable behaviors”).
In addition, some second-generation theory has challenged the primacy of litigation as a
means for redressing discrimination while also recognizing the value of courts working
collaboratively with employers to restructure workplaces. See Sturm, supra note 18, at 522-23
(recognizing the potential for achieving results through litigation where employers and
courts engage collaboratively in problem solving); see also Susan Sturm, Law’s Role in
Addressing Complex Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 35 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, eds., 2005)
(analyzing the role of courts in elaborating norms and working with nonlegal actors to shape
responses to complex discrimination). Others, however, have moved in directions more
attenuated from law, focusing primarily on redressing social norms around identity and
discrimination by restructuring extralegal conversations. See, e.g., KENJI YOSHINO,
COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006).
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deficiencies, we can begin to develop a picture of the features necessary to
create viable supplements or alternatives.
This Article proposes that the comparator methodology has retained its
popularity in large part because it serves entrenched judicial-legitimacy
preferences that favor clearly defined and identifiable categories and, relatedly,
disfavor sociologically oriented inquiries. With the advantage of an empirical
patina, comparators suggest that the slippery interactions between law and
lived experience in this area are susceptible to data-driven analysis based on
workplace facts and that the resolution of claims does not rest on a judge’s
subjective perceptions of complex workplace dynamics.29 This fits with the
general inclination of courts to analyze issues involving complex social
judgments in ways that appear to turn on “facts” rather than normative
judgments.30
Along these lines, comparators can also be described as having the virtues
of rules because they function to delineate sharply between situations where
discrimination might occur and where it might not. As a result, they appear to
constrain courts charged with discerning discrimination and, by the same
token, offer predictability to employers interested in avoiding discrimination
suits.31
On the other hand, however, comparators’ empirical cast masks the
inevitable and contestable judgments about the qualities that make for an
acceptable comparison,32 as well as the underlying normative judgments about
the nature of discrimination and the capacity of existing law to remedy

29.

30.

See infra Part V. Within the employment arena, comparators are likely also appealing
because their limited reach enhances the preservation of employer autonomy in workplace
decisionmaking, which has proven to be an enduring value in this area. See infra notes
215-217 and accompanying text.
See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and FactBased Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2006) [hereinafter Goldberg, Constitutional
Tipping Points]; Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist
Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629 (2002) [hereinafter Goldberg, Anti-Essentialist and
Social Constructionist Arguments].

31.

On these and other virtues of rules, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). Yet, as will be shown below and has been
addressed more generally in the context of the rules/standards debate, rule-like measures
and frameworks are typically embedded with unarticulated standard-like assumptions,
reinforcing the point that a binary distinction between rules and standards often masks the
mutually constitutive nature of those categories. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme
Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992)
(showing the malleability of rule and standard characterizations).

32.

Cf. Devon W. Carbado, The Ties that Bind, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 283, 294 (1998)
(“[O]ur identities are, on some level, unmanageable—fluid, contingent, and contestable.”).
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discriminatory harms.33 In the terms of the rules/standards debate, we could
thus say that the rule-like function of the comparator depends fundamentally
on normative, and standard-like, judgments about comparators’ probative
value.

33.

For example, a comparator framework focuses on capturing formal equality violations but
misses the antisubordination theorists’ concern with workplace conditions that are formally
equal but nonetheless exacerbate trait-related differences among employees. It will miss, for
example, the particular consequences for women when an employer refuses to allow breaks
or private space for breastfeeding because there are no male comparators. Likewise, an
employer who regularly makes sexualized or race-related comments to all employees would
not face a comparator-based claim because all employees would be subjected to the same
epithets. Yet the lack of breastfeeding accommodations as well as the making of sexual or
racist remarks can surely have a trait-differentiated effect on the ability of women and
members of racial minorities to perform in the workplace. See Lucinda M. Finley,
Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1144 (1986) (“[P]arceling out goods such as workplace benefits
according to egalitarian distributive principles may not result in people’s positions actually
coming out equal in the end.”); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 128 (1989) (arguing that “neutral” norms perpetuate bias); Ruth
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003
(1986) (advocating an antisubordination approach); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1059-61 (1978) (suggesting that the individualization of
discrimination claims has undermined efforts to use discrimination law to promote
distributive justice in the face of the historical practice of discriminating against a particular
group); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245 (1983) (arguing for
approaches to ending discrimination that emphasize substantive rather than formal or
procedural equality). Specifically with respect to women in the workplace, see Mary E.
Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 247, which observes that
a framework concerned with formal equality will be unable to address job structures that
clash with parenting responsibilities typically taken up by women; and Martha Chamallas,
Mothers and Disparate Treatment: The Ghost of Martin Marietta, 44 VILL. L. REV. 337, 338
(1999), which argues that “the ban on disparate treatment will not solve the work/family
conflict for women who experience actual, rather than perceived, conflicts because they find
that there are just not enough hours in the day.”
Still, as Owen Fiss has observed, although “the ideal of equality . . . is capable of a wide
range of meanings,” formal equality, which he describes as the “antidiscrimination
principle,” has become a “mediating principle” that underlies the concept of equality in both
Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976); see also Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976)
(defining the “antidiscrimination principle” as disfavoring racial classifications and arguing
that other inequalities may need to be addressed by different theories and principles,
including principles of economic justice). The Americans with Disabilities Act, with its
requirement that employers provide reasonable accommodation to employees with
qualifying disabilities, is understood as an exception to this general rule.
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In this light, we can conclude that for all of the judgment avoidance and
other instrumental values that comparators may bring to discrimination
analysis, courts put too much faith in them. The judicial default to comparators
crowds out not only other heuristics, but also other more textured conceptions
of discrimination, all of which is to the detriment of discrimination
jurisprudence and theory.34 By lowering the comparator heuristic’s pedestal, I
aim to clear a remaining barrier in the path of first-generation cases and to
illuminate and begin to redress the challenge that the comparator heuristic’s
dominance poses to second-generation theories’ translation to jurisprudence.
While the constraining effect of judicial-legitimacy concerns must be taken
into account, I argue that these concerns need not limit courts’ observation of
discrimination to instances where comparators can be found. Indeed, an
additional payoff from broadening the frame and considering other approaches
to seeing discrimination is that the rigidity and blinder-like effects of the
insistence on comparators come more clearly into focus. Concomitantly, the
virtues of the contextual analysis, currently applied mainly to harassment and
stereotyping claims, become clearer, as does that methodology’s applicability to
other discrimination cases.
Part I of this Article sets the foundation for the discussion here by outlining
the ways in which courts rely on comparators as both a default heuristic and an
element of discrimination law. Part II then shows that, notwithstanding the
occasional value of comparators for revealing discrimination, courts’ treatment
of comparators as central to discrimination analysis functions primarily to filter
out, rather than to facilitate recognition of, numerous types of discrimination.
This Part shows, too, the ways in which the insistence on comparators is
especially devastating for second-generation claims that rest on
intersectionality, identity performance, and structural theories of
discrimination. Building on this descriptive presentation, Part III looks
critically at the comparisons that we do accept, exposes the assumptions
embedded in them, and suggests that comparators do not warrant the degree
of reliance we now give them as illuminators of discrimination. Part IV
considers contextual analysis as a methodological alternative to comparators

34.
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This effort to reduce dependence on a flawed method for observing discrimination
dovetails, in a sense, with James Greiner’s recent effort to challenge the dominance of
multiple regression analysis as the chief statistical technique for observing discrimination.
See D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533 (2008).
For another approach to enhancing the value of statistical analysis in enabling comparison,
see Edward K. Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
2081 (2009).
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and shows how this approach governs discrimination cases involving
harassment and stereotyping.
Part V asks why comparators have had such sticking power, given their
serious limitations and the existence of alternate means of observing
discrimination. My aim here is both to shed light on the judicial-legitimacy
considerations that reinforce reliance on comparators and to identify factors
that may affect the potential for new methodologies to gain traction. I argue
that the sociologically complex nature of identity discrimination, combined
with entrenched concerns about unduly invading employer autonomy, lead
courts to prefer empirically styled observational approaches. These approaches,
in turn, can avoid the appearance of judicial subjectivity in evaluating
workplace dynamics. With these factors in mind, Part VI proposes and
evaluates several alternate methodologies intended to destabilize the
dominance of comparators in discrimination analysis. It considers, as well,
whether these alternatives can help recover the space for judicial consideration
of antidiscrimination norms that the comparator heuristic’s narrow window
has largely shut out from consideration.
i. the emergence and instantiation of comparators in
discrimination law
Observations about the relationship between comparators and
discrimination have ancient roots, dating back, at least, to Aristotle’s
observation that unequal treatment occurs when likes are not treated alike.35
Incorporating this view, contemporary discrimination law designates a set of
protected characteristics (or, in Aristotle’s terms, establishes a group of “likes”)
and imposes penalties on employers who use these characteristics as a basis for
treating employees differently and adversely (treating the “likes” as “not
alike”). Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, for example, specifies that it is
unlawful for an employer to “discriminate . . . because of” race, sex, and the
other characteristics protected in the law.36

35.

36.

ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1131a-b (Martin Ostwald trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co.
1962) (c. 384 B.C.E.). Aristotle also acknowledged that difficulty inhered in determining
whether comparators were sufficiently like each other. There is some irony in linking
Aristotle to today’s antidiscrimination regime in that he was arguably more concerned with
the problem of treating unlikes equally than in insuring broad-based equality. Id. (“[T]his is
the source of quarrels and recriminations, when equals have and are awarded unequal shares
or unequals equal shares.”) (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
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While the statute itself, like other antidiscrimination measures, does not
define discrimination in a comparative sense,37 comparators have clear appeal
as an aid for gauging whether discrimination has occurred. Initially, they make
visible the occurrence of comparatively adverse treatment by showing that not
all employees have been fired, disciplined, or otherwise unfavorably treated.
Then, comparison of the better- and worse-treated employees helps isolate
whether the protected trait is the reason for the adverse action. If an employer
has two employees who are similar but for X characteristic, and the employer
treats Employee X worse than Employee Not-X, we are generally comfortable
inferring that X is the basis, or cause, for the different treatment.38 As the
Second Circuit explained, “In the run of the mill discrimination cases . . . a
plaintiff can make a showing of disparate treatment simply by pointing to the
adverse employment action and the many employees who suffered no such
fate.”39
Of course, an inference is a logical determination from known facts,40 not a
guarantee of what actually occurred. But that is all that the law can reasonably
require if courts are to find discrimination where the employer denies having
discriminated.41 Consequently, because of their utility in producing inferences

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.
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It does elaborate the areas in which unlawful adverse treatment might occur, including
hiring and firing but also “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
Cf. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 10, 14 (1987) (observing that “what initially may seem to be an objective stance may
appear partial from another point of view”).
Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Billingsley v.
Jefferson Cnty., 953 F.2d 1351 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding sufficient evidence of race
discrimination where black employees were fired for excessive absences while a white
employee was only suspended for three days); Bradley v. Americold Servs., No. Civ. A. 972161-KHV, 1997 WL 613335 (D. Kan. Sept. 8, 1997) (denying summary judgment where an
employer terminated the black plaintiff for allegedly threatening harm to a coworker but
only suspended a white supervisor for threatening to kill two employees). But see, e.g.,
Flores v. Preferred Technical Grp., 182 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a national origin
discrimination claim where the plaintiff was terminated for breaking a work rule violated by
twenty-seven other employees, and where she and her sister (who was fired for a different
reason) were the only two recognizably Hispanic employees and the only two fired).
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (9th ed. 2009) (defining inference as “[a] conclusion
reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them”); cf.
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007) (“defining ‘inference’
as[, inter alia,] ‘a conclusion [drawn] from known or assumed facts or statements’”) (citing
16 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 949 (2d ed. 1989) (second alteration in original)).
Cf. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (noting that
“[t]he law often obliges finders of fact to inquire into a person’s state of mind” and that
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of discrimination, comparators have emerged as the predominant
methodological device for evaluating discrimination claims. Yet courts rely on
them far beyond their evaluative function, to the point that comparators are
treated not only as a useful heuristic for evaluating claims but also as an
essential element of a discrimination claim.
A. Comparators as the Default Methodology for Observing Discrimination
It is not surprising that courts have long looked to comparators as a tool to
aid in discerning whether impermissible discrimination has occurred. As the
Supreme Court explained early in its employment discrimination
jurisprudence, evidence that an employer treated comparable white workers
better than a black employee would be “[e]specially relevant” to showing
discrimination.42
Indeed, in the case just quoted, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the
Court first set out the burden-shifting framework that is now widely used in
evaluating employment discrimination claims where a plaintiff lacks direct
evidence of discrimination and is thus a focal point for the comparator
demand.43 This framework, when applied in the context of a hiring

“‘[i]t is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man’s mind at a particular
time is’” (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, [1885] Ch.D. 459 at 483 (Eng.))).
42.

43.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). The Court recognized that
other forms of evidence “may be relevant to any showing of pretext,” including “facts as to
the petitioner’s treatment of respondent during his prior term of employment; petitioner’s
reaction, if any, to respondent’s legitimate civil rights activities; and petitioner’s general
policy and practice with respect to minority employment.” Id. at 804-05 (emphasis added).
The Court added that “statistics as to petitioner’s employment policy and practice may be
helpful to a determination of whether petitioner’s refusal to rehire respondent in this case
conformed to a general pattern of discrimination against blacks.” Id. at 805. But the Court
also “caution[ed] that such general determinations [about discrimination patterns from
statistical analysis], while helpful, may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an
individualized hiring decision, particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason
for refusing to rehire.” Id. at 805 n.19. In effect, the Court suggested, absent an admission of
racial motivation from the employer, a comparator would likely be the most effective means
for showing whether impermissible discrimination had occurred because it could most
reliably establish that race discrimination was a proximate cause for the employer’s actions.
For discussion of discrimination cases in which courts have observed that actual
comparators are not necessary to a discrimination claim, see infra Part IV.
Because employers typically refrain from directly linking their adverse actions to an
employee’s protected trait, relatively few discrimination plaintiffs can present direct
evidence of discriminatory intent, meaning evidence that “‘if believed, proves [the] existence
of [a] fact in issue without inference or presumption.’” Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257,
1266 (11th Cir. 1999) (alterations in original) (quoting Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military

745

the yale law journal

12 0: 7 2 8

2 0 11

discrimination claim (the basis for Green’s claim against McDonnell Douglas),
requires an applicant to show that he or she (1) belongs to a protected class;
(2) applied to and was qualified for a position for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (3) was rejected for the position; and (4) that the position
remained open after that rejection and/or the position was offered to someone
else.44 Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the
employer, who must offer a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to
hire.45 After that, the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove that the
employer’s proffered reason was pretextual and that discrimination actually
motivated the adverse action.46
Within this framework, courts have split over precisely when the
comparator becomes relevant.47 For some, an employee must produce a
comparator at the outset, as part of the prima facie case; only after that will the

44.

45.
46.

47.
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Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also id. (describing direct evidence as “‘the
most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate’ on the
basis of some impermissible factor” (quoting Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582
(11th Cir. 1989))).
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The precise elements of the prima facie case will vary
depending on the factual context of the discrimination claim. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc.,
990 F.2d 1217, 1223 n.1 (11th Cir. 1993). For a discrimination claim in the context of ongoing
employment, for example, courts typically require that the plaintiff establish a prima facie
case by showing that “‘(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to
adverse employment action; (3) her employer treated similarly situated male employees
more favorably; and (4) she was qualified to do the job.’” EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc.,
220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th
Cir. 1999)). The Supreme Court has observed, in the context of an employment
discrimination case involving McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting, that the prima facie
showing was “‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.’” Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting Furnco. Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978)).
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
Id. at 807; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134 (2000)
(explaining that discrimination can be deemed the “most likely” explanation for the
employer’s conduct if the employer’s proffered justification is rejected). But see St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff does not necessarily
establish pretext by disproving the employer’s proffered justification for its action).
See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 194, 208 (“[S]ometimes the presence or absence of a
comparator is assessed by the court in determining whether plaintiff has made out her
prima facie case,” but “more commonly, . . . the court tends to find comparators critical for
pretext proof.”); cf. Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1243, 1290-91 (2008) (observing that plaintiffs can introduce evidence of
discrimination at both the prima facie and pretext stages). Of course, not each step of the
sequence (prima facie case, nondiscriminatory reason, showing of pretext) is reached in
every case.
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court shift the burden and require an employer to proffer a nondiscriminatory
reason for its adverse action.48 Other courts require, or strongly encourage, the
production of comparators only at the third, pretext phase of the sequence, at
which point the employee must show that the employer’s real reason for acting
adversely was the protected characteristic, notwithstanding any
nondiscriminatory reasons that the employer advanced in response to the
prima facie case.49 Although the difference between these approaches can have
great significance for an individual case,50 I leave the debate about their relative
virtues for another day, as my concerns with overreliance on the comparator
heuristic exist at all stages of the adjudication process.51

48.

See, e.g., Adebisi v. Univ. of Tenn., 341 F. App’x 111, 112 (6th Cir. 2009) (ruling that a
plaintiff “failed to make a prima facie showing of . . . discrimination, because he failed to
show that a similarly-situated, non-protected person was treated more favorably”);
Drake-Sims v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 330 F. App’x 795, 801 (11th Cir. 2009)
(same); Nagle v. Vill. of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1119 (7th Cir. 2009) (same); see also
Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009) (describing as a prong of the
prima facie case that the plaintiff must show that “he was treated less favorably because of
his membership in that protected class than were other similarly situated employees who
were not members of the protected class, under nearly identical circumstances”); Fields v.
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 520 F.3d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 2008) (same); Flores v. Preferred
Technical Grp., 182 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The linchpin of the plaintiff’s prima facie case
is evidence of disparate treatment between members of the plaintiff’s protected class and
nonmembers.”).

49.

See, e.g., King v. Hardesty, 517 F.3d 1049, 1063 (8th Cir. 2008) (describing and applying the
comparator requirement in the context of the pretext evaluation); Wright v. Murray Guard,
Inc., 455 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that the plaintiff had established a prima face case
of race discrimination but lacked an adequate comparator to demonstrate pretext); Harvey
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994) (same as King).
In rejecting the position that a discrimination plaintiff must produce an actual
comparator as part of the prima facie case, the Second Circuit criticized “the grotesque
scenario where an employer can effectively immunize itself from suit if it is so thorough in
its discrimination that all similarly situated employees are victimized.” Abdu-Brisson v.
Delta Airlines Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001). See also supra note 8.

50.

In a race discrimination case, the Eighth Circuit identified differing demands for
comparators within its own circuit, which ranged from a strict comparator demand at the
prima facie stage of the burden-shifting analysis to a “low threshold” demand at that stage,
accompanied by more rigorous review at the pretext stage. Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417
F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2005). Opting for the low threshold requirement, the court explained
that “[u]sing a more rigorous standard at the prima facie stage would ‘conflate the prima
facie case with the ultimate issue of discrimination,’ thereby effectively eliminating the
burden-shifting framework the Supreme Court has directed us to use.” Id. at 852 (quoting
Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1994)).
For further discussion of the insistence on comparators at the prima facie stage, see, for
example, Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in
Employment Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 839 (2002), which argues that requiring

51.
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Notably, while the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
facilitates examination of the challenged employment decision, it provides no
guidance as to the techniques that a court should use to sift through the
competing accounts of an employer’s action.52 The same is true of the
“mixed-motive” burden-shifting framework, in which the employee shows at
the outset that the protected trait was among the reasons for the employer’s
actions and the employer, in response, attempts to show that it would have
taken the same adverse act even without considering the protected trait.53
Comparators become relevant to the analysis, then, because they help
expose—whether in the single- or mixed-motive analysis—that “likes” have
been treated in an “unlike” fashion and give rise to the inference that
discrimination is the reason for that differentiation. The Supreme Court has
regularly affirmed comparators’ value for this purpose,54 as have lower courts,

52.

53.

54.

comparative evidence at the prima facie stage “violates the statutory language and also has a
number of other problems”; and Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate
Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2292 (1995), which maintains that “[s]erious
problems inhere in requiring the plaintiff to produce comparative data at the prima facie
stage of the case.”
See Malamud, supra note 51, at 2291 (pointing out that the McDonnell Douglass framework
does not “by its terms” require comparative evidence).
In contrast to the McDonnell Douglas analysis, where the individual plaintiff bears the
burden of persuasion throughout the adjudication process, in a mixed-motive case, once the
individual has established the employer’s reliance on a protected trait, liability attaches and
the employee will recover damages unless the employer can show persuasively that it would
have “taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). In that case, the employee can still obtain certain kinds
of declaratory or injunctive relief as well as attorney’s fees and costs. Id. § 2000e5(g)(2)(B)(i).
See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006) (“[Comparative evidence] may
suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext.”); O’Connor v. Consol. Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) (assuming that a comparator would be useful to
show that the employer had acted “because of” the plaintiff’s age); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-88 (1989) (“[A litigant] might seek to demonstrate that
[the employer’s] claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by
showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position.”).
The comparator heuristic is used to observe discrimination in other contexts as well.
With respect to the use of peremptory strikes of jurors during voir dire, for example, the
Court has struggled to determine how best to see whether discriminatory intent, rather than
permissible instinct, motivated the strike. In its most recent decision in this area, the Court
reinforced the value of comparison in illuminating whether race discrimination had occurred
in the use of a state’s peremptory strikes in a capital murder case. The Court first considered
statistics showing the disproportionately high use of peremptory strikes against black
potential jurors and then observed that
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which also typically treat them as their preferred lens for evaluating
discrimination claims.55 Commentators have observed as well that “the first
step in most discrimination cases is for the plaintiff to identify an individual of
another race (or the opposite sex, etc.) who was treated more favorably than
she—a comparator.”56

[m]ore powerful than these bare statistics, however, are side-by-side comparisons
of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to
serve. If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as
well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence
tending to prove purposeful discrimination.
55.

56.

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005).
Gossett v. Okla. ex rel Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 2001)
(explaining, in a sex discrimination suit brought by a man who had been involuntarily
withdrawn from a state university nursing program, that “evidence that the defendant
treated the plaintiff differently from others who were similarly situated . . . is especially
relevant to a showing of pretext”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230
(10th Cir. 2000) (noting that a plaintiff seeking to show discriminatory conduct by the
defendant “often does so by providing evidence that he was treated differently from other
similarly-situated employees who violated work rules of comparable seriousness”). As the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put the point, similarly situated comparators are
“‘usually the most probative means of proving that an adverse action was taken for
discriminatory reasons,’” even if they are “‘not absolutely necessary.’” Trs. of Health &
Hosps. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 871 N.E.2d 444, 451 (Mass. 2007)
(quoting Trs. of Health & Hosps. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 839 N.E.2d
861, 866 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)).
Sullivan, supra note 3, at 202. Sullivan adds:
The reality on the ground is that discrimination cases today increasingly turn not
on whether the plaintiff has proven her prima facie case or established that the
“legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” is a pretext for discrimination (although
the courts continue to invoke the McDonnell Douglas mantra), but rather on
whether the plaintiff has identified a suitable “comparator” who was treated more
favorably than she.
Id. at 193; see also Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
109, 181 n.270 (2007) (“The most common form of evidence offered in [cases based on
unconscious discrimination or bias] is comparative evidence . . . .”); Lidge, supra note 51, at
831-32 (describing the use of a comparator as “[a] common way of proving” discrimination
on account of a protected characteristic). Treatises take this position as well. See, e.g., 1 LEX
K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8D.04 n.3 (2d ed. 2009) (“The most common
way of demonstrating that an employer’s explanation for an adverse employment action is
pretextual is to show that similarly situated persons of a different race or sex received more
favorable treatment.”); id. § 8.02[6] (explaining that where the plaintiff alleges failure to
hire based on discrimination, the most common method of making a prima facie case “is to
show that the employer subsequently hired someone for the position, and that the hired
person had equal or lesser qualifications compared to those of the plaintiff”).
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B. Comparators as a Defining Element of Discrimination Law
In much of discrimination law, however, comparators have taken on an
importance beyond their service as a potentially useful heuristic for seeing
discrimination. They constitute, to many courts, a threshold requirement of a
discrimination claim and, in that sense, part of discrimination’s very
definition.57 On this view, discrimination occurs only when an actor has
differentiated between two groups of people because of a protected trait, which
means that the absence of a comparator signals the absence of discrimination.
Lower courts and commentators regularly take this position, insisting that
litigants identify comparators before their cases can proceed and treating the
absence of a comparator as fatal to a claim.58 An observation by the Eleventh
Circuit in a discrimination case brought by a black doctor who had been
removed from his position at a federal correctional institution is illustrative:
“[T]he plaintiff must show that his employer treated similarly situated
employees outside his classification more favorably than [himself].”59

57.

Justices Thomas and Kennedy have expressed such a view. See supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text.

58.

See, e.g., Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding
that the plaintiff could not sustain her discrimination claims because she “[could not] show
that similarly situated employees of other races were treated better”); Paluck v. Gooding
Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that to establish a prima facie case
for discriminatory discharge, the plaintiff must show that “she was discharged while other,
similarly-situated employees who were not members of the protected class were treated
more favorably”); Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999)
(ruling that the plaintiff “did not produce evidence sufficient to support a reasonable
inference that her termination was the result of race discrimination” because she failed to
identify satisfactory comparators); 3 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 47.05
(2d ed. 2009) (stating that, in the context of pregnancy discrimination, “if the employee
cannot show that she was in fact treated differently from similarly situated non-pregnant
employees, her claim will fail”); 3 LEX K. LARSON, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 54.02[6]
(2010) (observing that where a plaintiff alleges discrimination in hiring, “failure of the
plaintiff to present evidence of comparative qualifications of persons subsequently hired was
sometimes viewed as fatal to a plaintiff’s prima facie case”). But see 3 LEX K. LARSON,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, § 47D.05 (2d ed. 2009) (analyzing EEOC v. Nw. Mem’l
Hosp., 858 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Ill. 1994), where a “plaintiff’s failure to provide comparative
evidence was not fatal to her case”).
Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). But see, e.g., Bryant
v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 545-46 (4th Cir. 2003) (maintaining that
although comparative evidence may be “helpful,” a plaintiff “is not required as a matter of
law to point to a similarly situated white comparator in order to succeed on a race
discrimination claim”).

59.
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One analytic point is crucial here. If comparators are fundamental either to
discrimination statutes or to our theoretical conceptualization of
discrimination, then we can hardly object to their pervasive use. On the other
hand, if comparators are merely one choice among several for how courts
might go about the task of perceiving discrimination, as I contend here, then
we have reason to be more concerned. These questions are addressed in Parts
III and IV. For now, it is simply important to have a clear sense of comparators’
dominance in shaping discrimination jurisprudence.
ii. the comparator demand as a barrier to discrimination
claims
The judicial demand for comparators functions largely as a barrier to
discrimination claims, accounting in part for the low success rates of these
claims in ways that have gone underappreciated by courts and commentators.
This Part catalogues the sets of circumstances in which courts’ insistence on the
production of comparators inhibits or precludes discrimination claims.60 As the
discussion shows, the comparator demand poses a serious obstacle both
practically and conceptually. As a practical matter, comparators are hard to find
even in workplaces with a diverse group of employees. And conceptually, the
existence of a comparator is simply not relevant, under some discrimination
theories, to the question whether discrimination has occurred.
To assess the consequences of the comparator demand, I look separately at
first- and second-generation discrimination claims. Although the two types of
claims exist along a spectrum rather than as mutually exclusive groupings, the
distinction is useful for illuminating the separate ways in which the demand
operates for more traditional and more cutting-edge discrimination claims. As
noted at the outset, the first-generation cases rest on generally accepted
theories about both the kinds of discriminatory acts that are or should be
prohibited by governing statutes and the scope of the traits protected under
those statutes.61 These are, in other words, claims of sex, race, or other types of
discrimination that would be easily recognizable to the person on the street
even if they are not easily proven in court. The second-generation cases, by
contrast, offer a thicker conceptualization of discrimination that has not
achieved the same popular traction even though these cases are thought, in
much of the scholarly literature, to be one of the most important next steps for

60.

61.

I leave to the following Parts consideration of the impact of the comparator approach on the
meaning of discrimination.
See supra notes 18, 26 and accompanying text.
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bringing discrimination law closer to lived experience. As will become
apparent, a comparator-obsessed legal regime erects a serious barrier to many
first-generation claims and renders second-generation claims even less likely to
succeed.
Before turning to the comparator demand’s distinct effects on first- and
second-generation claims, one aspect of the comparator jurisprudence warrants
initial attention for its effect on the evaluation of evidence in nearly all
discrimination cases. When courts apply a comparator-based analysis, they
frequently disregard or discount evidence that is not associated directly with
the comparator. This means that adverse incidents directed at the plaintiff,
such as hostile remarks or treatment by noncomparator coworkers or
supervisors, are often marginalized as “stray” remarks and acts not worthy of
serious consideration.62 As the Eleventh Circuit observed in a housing
disability discrimination case that challenged a city’s use of zoning ordinances
to close down a drug-rehabilitation halfway house, for example, “Evidence that
neighbors and city officials are biased against recovering substance abusers is
irrelevant absent some indication that the recoverers were treated differently
than non-recoverers.”63 This deliberately acontextual approach, with its
“willingness to continue to compartmentalize various aspects of plaintiff’s
proof to find that none is sufficient,”64 is, I contend, a side effect of the
comparator analysis’s dominance and the skepticism toward discrimination
claims that emerges from that dominance.65

62.

63.

64.
65.

In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Justice O’Connor wrote that “stray remarks in the
workplace, . . . statements by nondecisiomakers, and statements by decisionmakers
unrelated to the decisional process itself” should not be treated as proving the connection
between an employer’s acts and the protected trait. 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 251 (majority opinion) (“Remarks at work that are based on sex
stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment
decision.”).
Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1216 (11th Cir. 2008). In the case, which
was brought under the Fair Housing Act, neighbors and city commissioners had made
statements about not wanting recovering drug users in their town, but the court deemed the
statements irrelevant because of the absence of a comparator. Id.
Sullivan, supra note 3, at 216 n.93.
This compartmentalization effect is even more notable because it runs contrary to the
Court’s suggestion that all evidence must be taken together in evaluating a discrimination
claim. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49 (2000)
(identifying as relevant, inter alia, the “strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the
probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and any other evidence
that supports the employer’s case”).
For a critique of the stray-remarks doctrine, see, for example, Catherine Albiston et al.,
Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Stereotyping
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A. The Comparator Default and First-Generation Cases
The comparator demand’s inhibiting effect on first-generation
discrimination claims can be seen in five primary ways. In many cases,
potentially comparable coworkers are not seen as sufficiently comparable
because of job responsibilities or workplace performance issues. In others,
potential comparators are seen as insufficiently probative because of concerns
about small sample size. In still others, the comparators are not seen as
probative because the individual bringing the claim has a unique position in
the workplace, works in an environment that is homogeneous with respect to
the relevant trait, or has a trait-related aspect of identity, such as pregnancy,
that is treated as inherently not comparable to others outside the trait-bearing
group.
1. No Sufficiently Comparable Coworkers
Most commonly, the comparator default blocks discrimination claims
because courts find that there is no individual sufficiently comparable to the
employee-plaintiff to show that the protected characteristic, rather than some
other factor, was the reason for the challenged adverse treatment.66 Often, this

66.

Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1293-96 (2008). These authors argue that “[s]ocial science
research has shown the value of ‘stray remarks’ as providing a window into the hidden
biases in the workplace,” id. at 1293, and that “[a]s social science research mounts and more
courts acknowledge that ‘[c]ontext matters’—indeed it matters a lot—in these cases, the
‘stray remarks’ doctrine may be cast aside,” id. at 1296 (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006)).
For example, in Holifield v. Reno, the court stated:
Holifield has failed to produce sufficient affirmative evidence to establish
that the non-minority employees with whom he compares his treatment were
similarly situated in all aspects, or that their conduct was of comparable
seriousness to the conduct for which he was discharged. Having failed to meet his
burden of proving he was similarly situated to a more favorably treated employee,
Holifield has not established a prima facie case.
115 F.3d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir. 1997); see also LaFary v. Rogers Grp., Inc., 591 F.3d 903, 909
(7th Cir. 2010) (finding that a coworker who took leave that was comparable to the leave
taken by the pregnancy discrimination plaintiff was not similarly situated based on the
employer’s needs at the time when the coworker was rehired but the plaintiff was not);
Senske v. Sybase, Inc., 588 F.3d 501, 510 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting an age discrimination
claim for lack of an adequate comparator while observing that “[a]lthough the ‘similarly
situated’ concept is a flexible one, the comparators must be similar enough that differences
in their treatment cannot be explained by other variables, such as distinctions in their roles
or performance histories” (citing Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2007))); White
v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 343 F. App’x 532, 535 (11th Cir. 2009)
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is because the plaintiff’s best evidence comes from a comparison to an
employee with a different supervisor67 or with insufficiently similar job
responsibilities68 or, in the case of a challenge to disparate enforcement of a
disciplinary rule, to an employee not subject to the same disciplinary
standards.69 Although the circuits vary somewhat in how they characterize the
match between comparators and the plaintiff, with some requiring that
comparators be “similarly situated in [all] material respects”70 and others

(“[W]hile [the plaintiff] may have shown that some non-minority individuals had isolated
issues in their backgrounds, he failed to identify any such individual that had the same
number of problems in [as] many areas as he had.” (third alteration in original) (internal
citation omitted)); Lewis v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 343 F. App’x 450, 454 (11th
Cir. 2009) (rejecting a comparator in a race discrimination case and stating that “[w]e
‘require that the quantity and quality of the comparator’s misconduct be nearly identical to
prevent courts from second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples
with oranges’”) (quoting Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir.
2006)).
67.

See, e.g., Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398 (10th Cir. 1997). Aramburu held that
“‘[s]imilarly situated employees,’” for the purpose of showing disparate treatment in
employee discipline, “‘are those who deal with the same supervisor and are subject to the
same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline.’” Id. at 1404 (quoting
Wilson v. Utica Park Clinic, Inc., 76 F.3d 394, No. 95-5060, 1996 WL 50462, at *1 (10th Cir.
Feb. 7, 1996)). The Sixth Circuit has stated:
[T]o be deemed “similarly-situated”, the individuals with whom the plaintiff
seeks to compare his/her treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor,
have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct
without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish
their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.
Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 659 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp.,
964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)). However, in its recent decision in Sprint/United
Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008), the Court declined to embrace a
categorical rule regarding whether evidence of discrimination had to come from
comparators with the same supervisor.

68.

69.

70.
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For example, in addressing a sex discrimination claim by a female secretary, the Second
Circuit wrote, “Given their quite different positions, no rational inference of disparate
treatment on the basis of gender could be drawn from evidence that [two male employees]
were not given the secretarial-type tasks assigned to” the female plaintiff. GaldieriAmbrosini v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 291 (2d Cir. 1998).
See, e.g., Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that, in
the disciplinary context, comparators must “‘have been subject to the same standards and
[must] have engaged in the same conduct without . . . differentiating or mitigating
circumstances’” (quoting Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th
Cir. 1998))).
See Perkins v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., 78 F.3d 747, 751 (1st Cir. 1996). See generally
Tricia M. Beckles, Comment, Class of One: Are Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs at an
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insisting on “nearly identical” comparators,71 all agree that the fit must be
tight.72
As this set of cases reveals, the comparator heuristic might work well for
observing discrimination in large, Tayloresque workplaces, where multiple
workers engage in tasks that are susceptible to relatively straightforward
comparison.73 Indeed, the very point of Taylor’s Shop Management was to
remove “[a]ll possible brain work . . . from the shop and center[]” the work
with managers.74 By reducing jobs to specific tasks and standardizing
supervision, Taylor prompted a shift in the workplace so that workers who had
once been skilled in a variety of aspects of production and supervision were

71.

72.

73.
74.

Insurmountable Disadvantage if They Have No “Similarly Situated” Comparators?, 10 U. PA. J.
BUS. & EMP. L. 459, 470-72 (2008) (reviewing the standards set out in several circuits).
As the Sixth Circuit wrote in the context of a disparate discipline complaint:
[T]he “comparables” [must be] similarly-situated in all respects. . . . [They] must
have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and
have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating
circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment
of them for it.
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Nix v. WLCY
Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[A] plaintiff fired for
misconduct makes out a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge if he shows that he is a
member of a protected class, that he was qualified for the job from which he was fired, and
‘that the misconduct for which [he] was discharged was nearly identical to that engaged in by
[an employee outside the protected class] whom [the employer] retained.’” (alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (quoting Davin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 678 F.2d 567, 570 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1982))).
In the separate but related context of whether comparative proof is sufficiently probative to
show that discrimination accounted for the selection of someone other than the plaintiff, the
Supreme Court rejected a lower court demand that the difference between comparators
must be “‘so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face.’” Ash v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456-57 (2006) (quoting Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F.
App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2005)). At the same time, the Court endorsed other demanding
characterizations of the comparator requirement. See id. at 457-58 (citing Cooper v. Southern
Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that “disparities in qualifications must be of
such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial
judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in
question”); Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that qualifications evidence alone could establish pretext where the plaintiff’s
qualifications are “clearly superior” to those of the candidate selected); Aka v. Wash. Hosp.
Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (concluding that pretext can be inferred
if “a reasonable employer would have found the plaintiff to be significantly better qualified
for the job”). For characterizations of the comparator requirement after Ash, see also supra
note 66.
See FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, SHOP MANAGEMENT 50 (1911).
Id. at 34.
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now performing a narrower set of routine—and easily comparable—tasks.
Within this system, whose very design aimed to create comparable jobs and
workers, the turn to comparators as a means of demonstrating discrimination
might have been imperfect but was surely viable in many instances.
Today, however, the workplace barely resembles its Taylor-inspired
predecessor. As Katherine Stone has observed, jobs are now “defined in terms
of competencies” and employees are valued, not for their fungible skill sets, but
for “their varied skills and flexibility.”75 In addition, “[t]he decentralization of
authority and the flattening of hierarchy” obscures what were previously clear
lines of authority, making it increasingly difficult to “locat[e] the responsible
party in the face of decentralized and dispersed decision-making.”76 Given the
flexible and dynamic nature of many contemporary jobs, the insistence on
comparators seems starkly mismatched with the work world as it currently
operates.
2. Small Sample Size
In other instances, the difficulty is that courts, while insisting on
comparators, are skeptical of the selected comparators’ probative value because
of concerns about sample size.77 As a federal district court observed in a race
and sex discrimination case brought by a black woman who worked as a
civilian for the Army, “The generally small sample size and lack of historical
data further undermined the evidentiary value of the statistics” showing that
black women were underrepresented in senior-grade Army positions.78 In

75.

See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE
CHANGING WORKPLACE 165 (2004); see also Jim Pope, Next Wave Organizing and the Shift to a
New Paradigm of Labor Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 515, 516 (2005-2006) (describing
“[f]lexibility and mobility” as “hav[ing] replaced predictability and stability as core values in
business organization”).

76.

STONE, supra note 75, at 165-66.
For discussion of the particular challenges that sample size concerns present for individuals
who bring discrimination claims based on more than one protected characteristic, see infra
notes 118-123 and accompanying text. Even in less complex, first-generation cases, samplesize issues can be impediments for individuals bringing discrimination claims.
Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986). In a Seventh Circuit case, Judge
Posner elaborated on an aspect of this sample size issue in a case brought by black female
students who argued that they were punished more harshly for hazing sorority pledges than
were comparable white students, where he rejected the proffered comparators as inadequate.
He observed:

77.

78.

In a large number of dissimilar cases, if there were reason to think the
dissimilarities were randomly distributed and therefore canceled out, an inference
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systemic disparate treatment challenges, the Court has similarly observed that
small sample sizes produce statistical analyses with little probative value.79 In
other words, when an employee relies on comparative evidence but is either
alone or one of few with his or her protected trait, courts have been skeptical
that the protected identity trait, rather than a quirk of the employee, is the
reason for the adverse action.
Current iterations of intersectionality theory suggest that this sort of
skepticism about the revelatory effects of comparison would be well founded
for all comparisons rather than just in cases where individuals present
intersectional discrimination claims. Because all individuals have
multidimensional aspects of their identities, very close comparisons are almost
always hard to come by.80 In this sense, the comparator analysis can be seen as
mismatched not only with today’s workplaces, as suggested above, but also
with contemporary understandings of identity.
3. Uniquely Situated Employees
In addition to the difficulties that arise where potential comparators may
actually exist in a workplace, there are several types of first-generation cases in
which there are simply no comparators from which to choose. In some cases,
an employee’s position is unique, particularly with regard to high-level
employees who cannot credibly claim that their responsibilities are closely

of discrimination might be drawn. And likewise in a small sample if the cases
were identical except for a racial difference. But in a very small sample of
dissimilar cases, the presence of a racial difference does not permit an inference of
discrimination; there are too many other differences, and in so small a sample no
basis for thinking they cancel out.
Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2008). Courts are often skeptical of data
drawn from small samples. See Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1076
(9th Cir. 1986) (“The problem with [a small sample size] is that slight changes in the data
can drastically alter appearances.”); Contreras v. City of L.A., 656 F.2d 1267, 1273 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1981) (“Statistics are not trustworthy when minor numerical variations produce
significant percentage fluctuations.”); Morita v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 541 F.2d 217,
220 (9th Cir. 1976) (“‘[S]tatistical evidence derived from an extremely small universe . . .
has little predictive value and must be disregarded.’” (quoting Harper v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975))).
79.

See N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-87 (1979); see also Mayor of Phila.
v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 620-21 (1974) (criticizing “the simplistic percentage
comparisons” used by the court of appeals as “lack[ing] real meaning in the context of [the]
case” and affirming “the District Court’s concern for the smallness of the sample”).

80.

For additional discussion of intersectionality theory, see infra notes 112-123 and
accompanying text.
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comparable to those of anyone else in the firm.81 One comment cites the “class
of one” of Carleton Fiorina, who lost her position as president and chief
executive officer of Hewlett-Packard and, had she wanted to bring a sex
discrimination claim, would have been precluded if required to show a
comparator.82 This difficulty also arises in other settings, such as academia,
where an employee is often the only specialist in his or her field and is thus
uniquely situated in terms of both work product and related responsibilities.83
More generally, in a knowledge-based economy, the blurring of lines
between higher- and lower-level jobs increasingly precludes employees from
finding comparators. As a result, even employees who are less senior will often
hold a unique position and will similarly find themselves without a
comparator.84 In addition, for contractual or other reasons, “cases occasionally
arise where a plaintiff cannot show disparate treatment only because there are
no employees similarly situated to the plaintiff.”85 In one of those cases, Pan
Am pilots who had joined Delta Air Lines were not positioned similarly to any

81.

82.

See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[There] are only a limited
number of potential ‘similarly situated employees’ when higher level supervisory positions
for medical doctors are involved.”).
Beckles, supra note 70, at 472.

83.

See, e.g., Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law’s Failure To Protect Women
Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 67 (1994) (analyzing the ways in which federal discrimination
laws have failed to protect women faculty members from discrimination in higher education
institutions).

84.

See, e.g., Sylva-Kalonji v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, No. 08-0207-KD, 2009 WL 1418808, at *6
(S.D. Ala. May 20, 2009) (finding a proposed comparator inadequate where the plaintiff, a
data clerk, and the proposed comparator each performed “unique duties”). But see Jackson v.
FedEx Corporate Servs., Inc., 518 F.3d 388, 396-97 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding the failure to
identify an identically situated comparator not fatal to Title VII claim where the plaintiff
worked in a “unique position”).

85.

Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001). In that case, the court
found that former Pan Am pilots who joined Delta Airlines had made out a prima facie case
of age discrimination, even though they had no comparator pilots, but ultimately found that
the Pan Am pilots failed to rebut the nondiscriminatory reasons offered by the airline for
their action. On the comparator point, the court wrote:
While Delta is a long way from the days when it had only a single employee, the
488 Plaintiffs in this case find themselves in a similar conundrum: they are in a
class all by themselves. Because all the Pan Am pilots hired by Delta were
subjected to the same three employment terms challenged in this action, and
because the Pan Am pilots differed materially from the pre-APA Delta pilots in
terms of their airline of origin and career expectations, there are no Delta
employees similarly situated to Plaintiffs who did not suffer the adverse
employment actions.
Id. at 467-68.
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others for purposes of their age discrimination claim because of the nature of
the agreements accompanying their hire. Thus, again, we see the lack of fit
between the comparator demand and the structure of many, if not most,
contemporary jobs.
In addition, the plaintiff’s particular situation with respect to workplace
conduct or performance might be distinctive enough to make it hard to come
by another comparable employee, even if the workplace has potential
comparators in it. In one pregnancy discrimination case, for example, an
employee was fired for excessive tardiness the day before her maternity leave
was set to begin and lost her case because she presented no evidence that
comparable employees were treated differently.86 The Seventh Circuit, per
Judge Posner, indicated that Ms. Troupe might have prevailed had she
presented a comparator such as a “Mr. Troupe, who [was] as tardy as Ms.
Troupe was, also because of health problems, and who [was] about to take a
protracted sick leave growing out of those problems” at the employer’s
expense.87 The court went on to express “doubt that finding a comparison
group would be that difficult.”88 Perhaps that particular employer had fired
many regularly tardy workers on the verge of taking extended sick leaves, but
in most, if not all, workplaces, the comparator would be far more difficult to
identify than Judge Posner suggests. Indeed, the Third Circuit acknowledged
this difficulty when denying the pregnancy discrimination claim of a woman
who was fired while absent on maternity leave. Finding that the plaintiff had
not identified an adequate comparator, the court added that “[o]f course, it
was difficult for her to make such a showing because Carnegie never has had an
employee on disability leave for a protracted period for a reason other than
pregnancy.”89
4. Homogeneous Workplaces
In other cases, the lack of comparators arises because the relevant part of
the workplace is homogeneous, in the sense that all potentially comparable
workers share the same trait that is the basis for the discrimination claim. In
those settings, a comparator regime will not recognize most forms of

86.

87.
88.
89.

Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the plaintiff
had not presented a comparator to substantiate her discrimination claim).
Id.
Id. at 739.
In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1997).
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discrimination.90 Yet this type of segregation in the workplace remains
widespread, which means that the comparator demand leaves large swaths of
employment outside the reach of discrimination protections. Sex-segregated
jobs, for example, are particularly common.91 In one illustrative case, all of the
relevant secretaries were female, which led the Second Circuit to reject a
secretary’s sex discrimination case because no comparator existed. “[A]lthough
she complains that she was treated less favorably than two employees who held
positions comparable to her secretarial position,” the court wrote, “both of
those employees were women.”92 From this, the court concluded that “[t]here
was no evidence that [the plaintiff] was treated differently because of her
gender.”93 Likewise, in a sex discrimination case brought by a mother with
young children whose request to be scheduled in a different time slot was
denied after she submitted a transfer request, the court held that “to establish a
prima facie case based on a ‘sex plus’ theory of employment discrimination, the
plaintiff must show that similarly situated men were treated differently than
women.”94 Her claim failed because she could not provide a comparator in the
form of a man with young children; there were no such men in her workplace.

90.

91.

As noted earlier and discussed in depth below, see infra Section IV.A, comparators are
typically not required for sexual harassment claims, so it is possible that a claim of that sort
would be recognized even in a homogeneous environment.
For a global analysis of sex-based occupational segregation, see MARIA CHARLES & DAVID B.
GRUSKY, OCCUPATIONAL GHETTOS: THE WORLDWIDE SEGREGATION OF WOMEN AND MEN
(2004).

92.

Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 291 (2d Cir. 1998). As Vicki
Schultz has explained in exploring the way that “lack of interest” arguments have been used
to justify sex-based differences in employment, a homogeneous workplace does not
necessarily indicate the absence of troubling gender bias. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories
About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII
Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990).

93.

Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 291.
Hess-Watson v. Potter, No. Civ.A. 703CV00389, 2004 WL 34833, at *2 (W.D. Va. Jan. 4,
2004); see also Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1086 (3d Cir.
1996) (stating that there would be insufficient evidence of gender discrimination against a
male employee who was denied a promotion that was subsequently awarded to a female
employee where “there is evidence that the decisionmaker was a man and that the great
majority of the employees in the job category at issue were men”). But see Lewis v.
Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1040 (8th Cir. 2010) (denying summary
judgment in a sex discrimination case where sex-stereotyping remarks had been made but
the plaintiff-employee lacked a male comparator).

94.
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The comparator demand has similarly been a barrier to discrimination
claims in racially homogeneous workplaces. Typical is this observation in a
discrimination case brought by an employee of Nigerian origin that was
affirmed by the Second Circuit: “[T]he other unit . . . caseworkers were all
African, so while Adeniji was the only person . . . assigned homemaking work
while the others were assigned protective diagnostic work and homemaking
work . . . he cannot claim that employees outside the Title VII protected class
were treated differently than those within the protected class.”95
5. Pregnancy, Breastfeeding, and the Nonexistent Comparator
Finally there are the pregnancy- and breastfeeding-related cases in which
there can be no precise comparator by reason of the different reproductive
capacities of men and women, and in which other comparators are generally
not entertained by courts.96 Most notorious, perhaps, is the Supreme Court’s
distinction between pregnant and nonpregnant people that led the Court to
conclude that pregnancy discrimination did not amount to sex discrimination
in Geduldig v. Aiello.97 When this distinction first appeared, the question was
whether California’s exclusion of pregnancy from the state disability program’s
coverage violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court saw the problem in
this way:
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such
under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory
analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two groups—
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.98

95.

96.

97.
98.

Adeniji v. Admin. for Children Servs., 43 F. Supp. 2d 407, 426 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citation
omitted); see also Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1997) (treating
the fact that eighty-eight percent of the defendant’s workforce were minorities as evidence
against the plaintiff’s race discrimination claim). But see Legrand v. Trs. of Univ. of Ark., 821
F.2d 478, 480 (8th Cir. 1987) (reversing as legal error a district court ruling that plaintiffs
had failed to establish a prima facie case because “the overwhelming majority of employees
in the Physical Plant is black”).
These cases, which present some of the most interesting questions related to the role of the
comparator heuristic, are also discussed below. See infra notes 223-225 and accompanying
text.
417 U.S. 484 (1974).
Id. at 496 n.20. And again: “There is no risk from which men are protected and women are
not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not.” Id. at
496-97.
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The Court took the same approach to a claim that pregnancy
discrimination amounted to sex discrimination under Title VII, reinforcing
that the relevant comparison was between “pregnant women and nonpregnant
persons.”99 Consequently, “[a]s a matter of law, at that time, ‘an exclusion of
pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage [was] not
a gender-based discrimination at all.’”100 While Congress overrode the Court’s
conclusion in Gilbert with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,101 which amended
Title VII’s definition of sex to include pregnancy-based distinctions, the point
for our purposes is that the comparator heuristic missed the possibility,
recognized by both the dissent102 and Congress, that the lack of a comparator
did not necessarily mean the absence of discrimination.
Sex discrimination challenges that have been brought related to
breastfeeding rules have fared about as well as those in Geduldig and Gilbert,
with courts finding that the absence of a comparator for breastfeeding women
rendered it unreasonable to see the rules as discriminatory based on sex. In a
decision derided by commentators,103 but representative of other decisions in
this area, the Sixth Circuit sustained Wal-Mart’s ban on breastfeeding in

99.

100.

101.

102.

103.
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See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976) (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496
n.20).
AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1970 (2009) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at
136).
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978, expanding the definition of
“sex” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include unequal treatment “because of or
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92
Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).
Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n reaching its conclusion that a
showing of purposeful discrimination has not been made . . . the Court simply disregards a
history of General Electric practices that have served to undercut the employment
opportunities of women who become pregnant while employed.”).
See, e.g., Katherine A. Macfarlane, Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores: Another Door Shut—A
Federal Interpretation Excluding Breastfeeding from the Scope of a State’s Sex Discrimination
Protection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2319, 2322 (2005) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit’s analysis . . . stymies
the natural expansion of sex discrimination protection.”); Elizabeth Hildebrand Matherne,
The Lactating Angel or Activist? Public Breastfeeding as Symbolic Speech, 15 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 121, 133-34 (2008) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s decision “leaves breastfeeding mothers
vulnerable in their everyday lives and pushes them back into the home by making the world
so uncomfortable and full of potential confrontations”); Brianne Whelan, For Crying Out
Loud: Ohio’s Legal Battle with Public Breastfeeding and Hope for the Future, 13 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 669, 673-74, 678 n.44 (2005) (analyzing an Ohio bill, H.B. 554,
125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2004), proposed in response to Derungs, that would
allow a “mother . . . to breast-feed her baby in any location of a place of public
accommodation wherein the mother otherwise is permitted”).
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public areas of the store against a state law sex discrimination claim.104 The
court insisted that a comparator analysis be followed, holding that “for there to
be impermissible sex discrimination, there must be one gender that is treated
differently than another.”105 Continuing, the court explained that no sex
discrimination had occurred because the only prohibition Wal-Mart imposed
was on a type of feeding that only women could do, and there was, therefore,
no class for comparison.106 The court also pointed out that the same insistence
on a comparator had doomed several other challenges to breastfeeding-related
restrictions, including one where a federal district court had found that “the
lack of a similarly-situated class of men was fatal to the plaintiff’s [Title VII]
claim: ‘if there is no comparable subclass of members of the opposite gender,
the requisite comparison to the opposite gender is impossible.’”107 Of the
numerous district and appellate court cases it reviewed related to breastfeeding
restrictions, none “found that breast-feeding fell within the scope of gender
discrimination because of the absence of a comparable class.”108
Thus, a conceptualization that recognizes discrimination only in the
presence of a comparator will simply not observe discrimination even in cases,
like many of those just discussed, that fall well within widely accepted,
first-generation theories of discrimination. Indeed, in some of these settings,
the comparator requirement’s very design forecloses recognition of the
possibility that discrimination might have occurred, including in homogeneous
work environments and situations where women and men are seen as being
categorically different from one another.109 That is, by demanding that
plaintiffs produce a comparator to have a viable case, courts have transformed
the comparator methodology into the substantive law of discrimination.
Because that method, as applied, allows for only a narrow set of circumstances

104.

Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004).

105.

Id. at 437.
Id.

106.
107.

Id. at 439 (emphasis added) (quoting Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)).

108.

Id. (emphasis added).
While these cases involving discrimination claims because of a particular aspect of the lives
of many women, such as reproduction or childcare, could fit within the discussion of
second-generation claims as well, I include them here because they were framed as relatively
straightforward discrimination cases yet were barred, nonetheless, by the comparator
demand. Cf. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995) (questioning whether the
recognition of differences between men and women related to reproductive capacity as
categorical overstates the difference between socially constructed and biologically rooted
gendered distinctions).

109.
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to be considered discriminatory, the law of discrimination has, in effect, been
narrowed as well.
B. The Comparator Heuristic’s Flaws as Amplified in Second-Generation Cases
Not surprisingly, if finding an adequate comparator is difficult in a
“simple” discrimination case, where an individual alleges that he or she was
treated differently because of his or her protected trait, then the task becomes
even more daunting when a claim rests on a more complex understanding of
identity or the surrounding workplace structures. Many of the problems posed
by the comparator demand in these cases echo those just discussed. Still, the
ways in which they manifest render nearly all second-generation cases
nonviable, reinforcing the starkness of the disconnect between these newer
theories of discrimination and the existing comparator-focused
jurisprudence.110 Hence their separate treatment here.111
1. Intersectionality
Among the various cases that track intersectionality theory’s insights, the
simplest are known as trait-plus cases, in which an employer imposes a rule on
members of one group in a workplace based on a combination of their
protected trait and some other unprotected attribute, such as having young
children or being married to a fellow employee. An early case in this area,
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., signaled the possibility of success for an
individual who could show, via an explicit policy such as a bar on employment
applications from women with small children, that an employer had treated a
subset of employees adversely because of a protected trait.112 Absent an
explicitly discriminatory policy, however, an individual is typically required to
produce a comparator to show that the adverse treatment is trait-based. This
means that the individual must identify a coworker who not only has
comparable job responsibilities and lacks the same protected trait but also has
the same unprotected attribute, such as parental or marital status.

110.

111.

112.
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The last Part of this Article returns to this disconnect to discuss alternate methodologies that
have the potential to be inclusive of the thicker, second-generation conceptualizations of
discrimination.
Even for those who would not characterize the circumstances described below as involving
discrimination, it is useful to see the similarities in the ways in which the comparator
demand affects consideration of both these and first-generation types of claims.
400 U.S. 542 (1971). In Martin Marietta, there was a clear comparator group of men with
small children whose applications were not barred by the challenged rule. Id. at 544.
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Given the difficulties associated with finding an adequate comparator in the
simplest of circumstances, as described earlier, there are likely to be even fewer,
if any, close comparators in these kinds of cases.113 Consider, for example, the
Tenth Circuit’s rejection of a sex discrimination claim by an airport custodian
shift supervisor who alleged that she was treated worse than the male shift
supervisors when she was fired because her husband, whom she supervised,
was reported to have left his workplace during his shift.114 The court cited a
litany of cases for the proposition that “gender-plus plaintiffs can never be
successful if there is no corresponding subclass of members of the opposite
gender.”115 Adding that “[s]uch plaintiffs cannot make the requisite showing
that they were treated differently from similarly situated members of the
opposite gender,”116 the court found that Ms. Coleman’s claim failed because
she could not show that the employer treated her “differently from men who
also were married to subordinate employees.”117
More complicated still are the situations in which an individual claims
discrimination based on more than one protected category. These
intersectional or multidimensional claims arise when an individual seeks to
show that the employer discriminated because of the individual’s particular
combination of traits, rather than simply trying to show that the employer
discriminated on two distinct grounds.118 As one court explained in connection

113.

The challenge here is thus somewhat similar to the challenge for the “unique” Mrs. Troupe
in the pregnancy-leave discrimination case described above. See supra text accompanying
notes 87-89.

114.

Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1204. As the court also explained, in a “plus”-type case, “although the protected class
need not include all women, the plaintiff must still prove that the subclass of women was
unfavorably treated as compared to the corresponding subclass of men.” Id. at 1203.

115.

116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1204.
Id. at 1205.
See, e.g., Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 653-55 (9th Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting) (stating that a comment about the plaintiff having a “typical Hispanic macho
attitude” and others like it showed “particularly offensive stereotypes about Hispanics as
lazy, and about Hispanic males as aggressive and domineering” and finding that the
remarks and other conduct stated a claim “as to whether [the plaintiff] was subjected to an
abusive workplace because of his race and his sex”); Anthony v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 898 F.
Supp. 1435, 1445 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (denying defendants’ summary judgment motion and
stating that “the epithet ‘black bitch’ cannot be designated exclusively as either racist or
sexist”); see also Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that
African-American women did not constitute a discrete class for the purposes of a Title VII
suit); DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976)
(“[T]his lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race discrimination,
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with a suit brought by an Asian woman, for example, “Asian women are
subject to a set of stereotypes and assumptions shared neither by Asian men
nor by white women” so the absence of evidence of discrimination against
Asian men or white women would not disprove the plaintiff’s claim.119
Most courts exclude as possible comparators anyone who shares any of the
protected characteristics that form the basis of the plaintiff’s claim,120 so that
finding a comparator for an intersectional claimant is even more difficult than
it is for individuals who base their claim on one protected characteristic. As one
court explained, “[T]he more specific the composite class in which the plaintiff
claims membership, the more onerous th[e] ultimate burden” of proving
discrimination becomes.121 Thus, even if anecdotal and social science evidence
reveals the real experience of intersectional discrimination,122 it will usually be
impossible, as a practical matter, for an individual to find his or her negative
mirror image to show that discrimination has occurred. As a result, as one
commentator has observed, “courts have basically given up on the complex
subject.”123
2. Identity Performance
A second type of complex case for which the comparator demand inhibits
the observation of discrimination is the identity performance case. In
developing the idea that “[w]orkplace discrimination is driven by more than

119.

120.

121.
122.
123.
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sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both.”), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994); see also id. (“[T]he attempt to
bisect a person’s identity at the intersection of race and gender often distorts or ignores the
particular nature of their experiences.”); Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615
F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The essence of Jefferies’ argument is that an employer
should not escape from liability for discrimination against black females by a showing that it
does not discriminate against blacks and that it does not discriminate against females.”);
Kotkin, supra note 15, at 1475 (describing Lam as “one of very few ‘plus’ claims to have met
success”).
See Kotkin, supra note 15, at 1491-92; cf. Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06CV-11977-DT, 2007 WL 907822, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (“Courts are split . . .
over whether the proper comparator may only include a person outside of the protected
class who has the same ‘plus characteristic’ as the plaintiff (in this case, a male with young
children) or whether the comparator may include any person (male or female) who lacks the
‘plus’ characteristic (in this case, a female without young children).”).
Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 327 (D. Md. 2003).
See Kotkin, supra note 15, at 1446 & n.22 (discussing sources).
Id. at 1462.
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the physiological markers of outsider difference,”124 Devon Carbado and Mitu
Gulati observed that outsiders who want to succeed in a workplace “often find
themselves having to do extra work to make themselves palatable and their
insider employers comfortable.”125 Addressing clothing and hairstyle choices,
language use, and styles of socializing, Carbado and Gulati identify “strategic
passing,” “comforting,” “using prejudice,” and other strategies as existing
along this continuum of identity work.126 Those who do not engage in these
“comfort strategies” may find themselves out of work or outside the
partnership track.
In considering what a discrimination claim on these grounds might look
like, Carbado and Gulati offer the example of the “fifth black woman” who
presents herself, through her choices about clothing and socializing, in ways
more associated with African-Americans than do four other black female
colleagues.127 Ultimately, the four others get promoted but the fifth black
woman does not, although all have produced comparable work. The question
for purposes here becomes whether a court could recognize race discrimination
in that set of facts, which indicate that the fifth employee’s nonpromotion was
because of the way she performed her race. Even if the fifth black woman could
produce a comparator from outside of her demographic group, such as a white

124.

Carbado & Gulati, supra note 21, at 1307; see also Green, Work Culture, supra note 23, at 628
(“[S]etting behavioral expectations along a white, male norm imposes extra performance
costs on outsiders and forces reconstruction of identity.”); Gowri Ramachandran,
Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor
Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 300 (2005) (“[N]egotiating multiple identity performance
demands simultaneously often places intersectionals in a uniquely restricted situation, one
that has been referred to in other contexts as a ‘catch 22’ or ‘double bind.’”); Camille Gear
Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1199-1230, 1269 (2004) (arguing that interpretations of Title VII
that “fail to account for the role that volitional behavior or race/ethnicity performance plays
in defining individual identity” leave courts unable to reach “equitable resolution” of
discrimination claims); Laura Morgan Roberts & Darryl D. Roberts, Testing the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law: The Business, Legal, and Ethical Ramifications of Cultural Profiling at
Work, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 369, 378-86 (2007) (discussing “[i]dentity
[p]erformance as a [s]trategic [r]esponse to [w]orkplace [c]ultural [p]rofiling”); Kimberly
A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365, 369 (2006) (“This paper seeks to begin the process of defining the
ways in which employers use trait discrimination so as to begin a more useful normative
discussion about when, if ever, antidiscrimination law should prohibit such
discrimination.”).

125.

Carbado & Gulati, supra note 21, at 1307.
Id. at 1299-1307.

126.
127.

See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
701, 714-19 (2001).
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man, the promotion of four “comparable” peers who are similar with respect to
their race and sex (that is, the protected traits on which a claim might be filed)
would likely be treated as undermining any inference of discrimination a
factfinder might otherwise draw from the comparison.128 There may well be
other strategies for illuminating the possibility that the employer acted with
discriminatory intent, as will be discussed shortly, but comparison will be
unavailing.
Perhaps the most classic illustration of identity-performance discrimination
from case law is Rogers v. American Airlines, in which a federal district court
rejected a claim that the airline’s prohibition of cornrows amounted to race
discrimination.129 “[E]ven if socioculturally associated with a particular race or
nationality,” the court wrote, the hairstyle “is not an impermissible basis for
distinctions in the application of employment practices by an employer.”130 The
Rogers analysis has since been repeated by numerous courts, which have
rejected employees’ claims that employer restrictions on or comments about
personal appearance choices amount to trait-based discrimination.131 In a case

128.

See, e.g., Smith v. Planas, 975 F. Supp. 303, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Five of the seven
individuals identified by Plaintiff as having received higher-paying assignments were
black—members of Plaintiff’s protected class. As such, Plaintiff has failed to make out a
prima facie case of race discrimination because he cannot show that the adverse employment
action taken against him occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of race
discrimination.”); Samuels v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., No. 94-CV-8645, 1997 WL
253209, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1997) (finding that an African-American woman failed to
articulate a prima facie case for race discrimination because, as two of her alleged
comparators were African-American men, she “[could not] show that the adverse
employment action taken against her . . . occurred in circumstances giving rise to an
inference of race discrimination”). But see, e.g., Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 43
(2d Cir. 2000) (“[Because] Title VII’s principal focus is on protecting individuals, rather
than a protected class as a whole, an employer may not escape liability . . . simply because it
can prove it treated other members of the employee’s group favorably.”).

129.

527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Rogers argued that the grooming policy “discriminate[d]
against her as a woman, and more specifically as a black woman.” Id. at 231; see also id. at
231-32 (quoting Rogers’s contention that the cornrow style “‘has been, historically, a fashion
and style adopted by Black American women’”). Scores of articles have analyzed the Rogers
decision and the racial nature of the airline’s selective hairstyle restriction. See, e.g., Paulette
Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365;
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title
VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010).

130.

Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
See, e.g., Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing
numerous cases to support the conclusion that sex-based hair length rules do not violate sex
discrimination prohibitions); Pitts v. Wild Adventures, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL
1899306, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008) (finding that a theme park employer’s ban on
dreadlocks and cornrows did not amount to race discrimination in part because “the policy

131.
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against the United Parcel Service, for example, a driver alleged racial
discrimination and harassment in connection with comments about his
dreadlocks, which he associated with his African identity as well as his religious
beliefs.132 Among other comments, UPS managers told him he looked like
Stevie Wonder, equated his hair with drug use, and more.133 Yet the court
concluded that race was not implicated. “These comments and abuse,” the
court wrote, “while hurtful, sophomoric and insulting, are not racist in nature
and do not support a reasonable inference of racial discrimination.”134 Likewise,
another district court found that an employer’s conduct was harassing but not
racially motivated when he criticized an African American employee’s
hairstyles, “commented ‘it’s a black thing’ one day when Miller was discussing
her hair and fingernails with a white female co-worker,” and asked her, among
other similar questions, whether she was going to the zoo or to the jungles of
Nigeria when she wore an animal-print top.135
In these cases, the comparator demand plays what might be described as a
supporting role in limiting the discrimination theory’s reach. Although courts
are generally dismissive of grooming code discrimination claims as restrictions
on “personal preference” rather than identity,136 they also take the absence of
comparators to reinforce the absence of discriminatory intent. For example, in
Eatman, the court observed that the driver “ha[d] not identified any specific
similarly situated non-black employee who was not disciplined for violating
the hair appearance guideline.”137 It added, in response to the driver’s showing
that seventeen of the eighteen affected employees were black, that this

applies to all races and there is no evidence that the policy was enforced only against
African-Americans”); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 n.4 (N.D.
Ind. 1998) (citing Rogers to sustain store’s sex-based hair length rules); see also Jespersen v.
Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (sustaining sex-based
grooming code restrictions against a sex discrimination claim); Austin, 20 F. Supp. 2d at
1256 (holding, with respect to a grooming code, that “discrimination based on factors of
personal preference” does “not necessarily restrict employment opportunities and thus” is
“not forbidden”).
132.

133.
134.
135.

136.
137.

Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Thanks to
Kimberly Yuracko for discussion of Eatman and some of the other contemporary identity
performance cases noted here.
Id. at 261, 264.
Id. at 265.
Miller v. CCC Info. Sys., Inc., No. 95 C 6612, 1996 WL 480370, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22,
1996). Miller had argued that the hairstyle and clothing comments “were ‘racial’ because
white people do not wear their hair in the same style.” Id. at *3.
See, e.g., Austin, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1256.
Eatman, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
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circumstantial evidence “would not, on its own, reasonably support a finding
of discriminatory intent against African Americans.”138 Likewise, in Rogers,
even while the court stressed that “[a]n all-braided hair style is an ‘easily
changed characteristic,’” it bolstered its argument by observing that the
cornrows ban “applies equally to members of all races.”139
3. Structural Discrimination
In a third situation—where workplace norms, structures, and interactions
tend to obscure discriminatory intent (the “structural” cases)—the treatment of
comparators as prerequisite to a claim may also exacerbate the difficulties that
individuals already face in illuminating discrimination. The claim of structural
analysis, as noted earlier, suggests that standard enforcement of discrimination
laws misses many of the ways in which members of nondominant groups are
excluded or marginalized not only by their supervisors but also by coworkers
and others, with a detrimental effect on the terms and conditions of their
employment.140 This analysis, which reflects both the changed workplace and
our increasingly refined understanding of the dynamics producing inequality,
requires adjudicators to recognize complexly constituted, nonexplicit bias in
interactions that often take place over time.141
The difficulty is that this view of the dynamics that produce inequality does
not match the behavioral assumptions behind the comparator approach, which
rely most heavily on striking differences in an employer’s treatment of
comparable coworkers as the signal of discriminatory intent.142 A woman may
be given less weighty assignments or excluded from certain meetings or
outings that ultimately limit her opportunities to advance within a firm, yet
unless a precisely comparable male colleague has not been excluded, the
different treatment will not be legible for a court focused on actual
comparators. Consider the law firm environment, for example. Because
associates work on an array of cases, often with a variety of supervisors, a

138.

139.
140.
141.

142.
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Id.; see also id. at 265 (“Locked hair . . . is not so closely associated with black people that a
racially neutral comment denigrating it can reasonably be understood as a reflection of
discriminatory animus . . . . ”).
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
See Sturm, supra note 18, at 469 (explaining that the complexity of these claims “lies in the
multiple conceptions and causes of the harm, the interactive and contextual character of the
injury, the blurriness of the boundaries between legitimate and wrongful conduct, and the
structural and interactive requirements of an effective remedy”).
See supra note 72.
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female associate is unlikely to be able to identify a sufficient number of closely
comparable colleagues with sufficiently similar credentials and assignments to
make a persuasive case of sex-based disparate treatment based on differences in
assignment quality.143
Notably, some recent class actions have succeeded in persuading courts, at
least for class certification purposes, that a particular type of hiring or
promotion process (usually one in which supervisors have relatively unfettered
discretion) is likely to facilitate discrimination based on a protected
characteristic.144 Ordinarily, though, the constricted view of comparators that
operates in most cases means that few plaintiffs are able to provide an adequate
comparator class that has not been disadvantaged by the employer’s practices.
In short, although comparison is the dominant method used for observing
discrimination, an actual and sufficient comparator turns out to be
unattainable for most individuals who claim discrimination. Further, because
of the numerous situations in which a comparator does not exist by virtue of
the theory underlying the claim, the insistence on comparators renders whole

143.

144.

Cf. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting a
claim that a law firm’s assignment system had disadvantaged the plaintiff because of sex
rather than because of her academic credentials); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why
Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L.
REV. 493, 585 (1996) (arguing that “[n]either disparate treatment nor disparate impact
analysis is well suited to rooting out the kind of adverse employment practices” related to
assignments, training, and mentoring that are critical to advancement within law firms); S.
Elizabeth Foster, Comment, The Glass Ceiling in the Legal Profession: Why Do Law Firms
Have So Few Female Partners?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1631, 1642-43 (1995) (discussing the
“exclusionary and discriminatory behavior” in law firms that results in women’s diminished
opportunities for advancement).
See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (certifying a
sex discrimination class action based in part on a determination that the employer’s
promotion practices could have facilitated sex-based decisionmaking) cert. granted, 79
U.S.L.W. 3128 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., Nos. C-944335 SI & C-95-2182 SI, 1997 WL 605754, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997) (sustaining
certification of a sex discrimination class action challenging hiring and promotion practices
and quoting expert testimony explaining that “[i]n the context of a male-dominated culture,
relying on highly arbitrary assessments of subjective hiring criteria allows stereotypes to
influence hiring decisions”). But see, e.g., EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d
292, 305 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a race discrimination in hiring claim and holding that
“[w]ithout probative evidence of discriminatory intent, however, Miniature is not liable
when it passively relies on the natural flow of applicants for its entry-level positions”);
EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6:01-CV-339, 2010 WL 583681, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 16,
2010) (excluding expert witness testimony regarding the link between an employer’s
practices and sex discrimination on the grounds that the expert had not shown
discriminatory intent when concluding that the “overwhelmingly male-dominated
workforce” was likely to influence hiring decisions).
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categories of potentially discriminatory conduct beyond the reach of
discrimination law.
iii. on the conceptual limitations of comparators
As we have seen, courts place comparators on something of a doctrinal
pedestal by treating them as the default heuristic and as a threshold
requirement for illuminating whether discrimination could have occurred. Yet
the vast number of cases in which comparisons simply cannot be made begs
the question whether comparators deserve this status and whether we ought to
accept, as many courts and individual judges have, that if no comparison can be
drawn, discrimination could not have occurred.
This Part argues that courts’ unequivocal embrace of comparators
overstates comparators’ revelatory powers related to discrimination in two
ways. First, the heuristic is overinclusive; it does not prove as much as it is
often treated as proving, at least not without important additional assumptions
from the factfinder. And second, the heuristic is underinclusive; a comparator’s
absence does not necessarily show that discrimination has not occurred. To be
clear, I am not suggesting that, as a result of these vulnerabilities, we abandon
comparators entirely as a means of recognizing discrimination. Indeed, given
the challenges associated with any means of observing discrimination, coupled
with the entrenched judicial preferences for comparators and the heuristic’s
occasional utility, that position would be both unwise and unrealistic.
My point, instead, is that comparators, like other methodological devices,
work by virtue of unstated assumptions about the nature of discrimination and
about how best to identify it. When we take account of these assumptions, we
will be better positioned to see that the comparatively different treatment
revealed by the heuristic is a byproduct of discrimination rather than
discrimination itself. With that awareness, we will also be better positioned to
avoid erroneously insisting upon the presence of a differently treated
comparator as a necessary (and, in some cases, sufficient) element of
discrimination.
A. Comparators as Overinclusive
At the most basic level, comparators are surely useful in reducing the set of
variables that might explain an employer’s adverse treatment of one employee
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relative to another.145 Yet the move from the reduced set of explanations to the
conclusion that an employer more likely than not acted because of the
employee’s protected trait is not as defensible as courts sometimes suggest.
Indeed, the confidence that many courts express in the power of
comparison to reveal discrimination contrasts sharply with other significant
strands of American discrimination jurisprudence that recognize the complex
and idiosyncratic nature of most employment decisions. As the Court has
observed, “[T]reating seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in
the employment context is par for the course.”146 Again: “To treat employees
differently is . . . . simply to exercise the broad discretion that typically
characterizes the employer-employee relationship.”147 Although the Court was
writing in the context of a public employee’s equal protection argument that
her layoff was impermissibly arbitrary, its understanding that employers
“‘often must take into account the individual personalities and interpersonal
relationships of employees in the workplace’”148 could hardly be limited to
those circumstances.
Yet if the baseline expectation is that employers will regularly treat
similarly situated employees differently,149 different treatment of comparable
coworkers is likely to reflect merely benign variation in the workplace.150 On
this view, the comparator heuristic would be flawed if the fact of different
treatment triggered our suspicion that discrimination had occurred.

145.

146.

If two employees have the same educational and experiential qualifications and similar job
responsibilities, the set of possible explanations for the employer’s negative treatment of one
of them is significantly reduced. As compared to a situation in which the employees have
different qualifications and responsibilities, then, discrimination is proportionately more
likely to be the reason for the employer’s adverse action.
Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 604 (2008).

147.

Id. at 605; see also Ezold, 983 F.2d at 542 (observing that Title VII “does not require
employers to treat all employees fairly”).

148.

Engquist, 553 U.S. at 604 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 48, Engquist, 553 U.S. 591 (No. 911780)).

149.

This view that employers regularly act arbitrarily but without discriminatory intent
reinforces, and is reinforced by, the strong commitment to at-will employment and the
related reluctance of courts to “second-guess difficult and expertise-laden personnel
judgments.” David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and
Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for “High-Level” Jobs, 33 HARV.
C.R-C.L. L. REV. 57, 100 (1998). For further discussion of the comparator heuristic’s
synergies with judicial deference to employers, see infra notes 215-217 and accompanying
text.

150.

But see Selmi, supra note 15, at 561-62 (arguing that courts underestimate the probability that
discriminatory intent infects this sort of seemingly idiosyncratic treatment).
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Even if employers ordinarily treat similarly situated employees in the same
way, different treatment can signal discrimination only if we make several
additional, arguably fragile assumptions. For one, reliance on comparators as
expositors of discrimination assumes that employers act rationally, so that
when they deviate from their typical equal treatment model, they do so
deliberately in a way that reliably signals discrimination.151 If we assume,
instead, that employers are not fully rational, we can find discrimination only
by making the additional assumption that discriminatory intent, rather than
arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, is more likely to explain deviations from equal
treatment.152
Of course, any exercise in comparison also requires the analyst to treat the
inevitable differences between individuals as nonsalient. Because all individuals
have multidimensional aspects of their identities, as current iterations of
intersectionality theory show, very close comparators are hard to come by even
for a relatively simple discrimination claim. In almost any setting, there are
innumerable differences between individual employees, both by virtue of
personal background and job assignments, that conceivably could explain an
employer’s adverse action against one but not another. In “high-skill or
knowledge intensive jobs,”153 this is true almost by definition, as no positions
are exactly alike or often even very similar—at least in a workplace striving for
an efficient, nonduplicative management structure. This not only makes
monitoring difficult154 but also renders the comparator heuristic virtually
unusable, as the essence of hiring and promotion in these positions depends on
the unique set of skills and contacts that an experienced professional brings to a
position. In this light, different treatment can nearly always be attributed to
nondiscriminatory motivations. Yet the typical judicial reliance on the
comparator heuristic does not ordinarily engage in depth, or at all, with those
consequential determinations.
Even in the context of lower-level positions, a comparison between two
individuals who perform the same function but differ by the nature of their
protected trait shows us intentional discrimination occurred only if we make
assumptions that allow the comparison to do so. In this context, I think back to
my days working at an ice cream shop. My manager, Chip, never liked me

151.

152.
153.
154.

774

Relatedly, if we were to treat job descriptions as reliable indicators of which jobs might be
comparable across positions in a firm, we would assume a stability that runs contrary to the
dynamic realities of actual jobs in any given workplace.
See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 527 (1993).
Charny & Gulati, supra note 149, at 60.
Id. at 60-61.
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much and made clear from time to time that he wanted to fire me. Had he done
so while leaving in place my male coworkers and replacing me with a young
man, I could have demonstrated a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Or, if
he fired only me after learning that every scooper, including me, gave away ice
cream to friends, the comparison could also suggest sex discrimination—
disparate punishment of similarly situated employees for the same offense—if
we let it. Given what we know about Chip’s sentiments toward me, however,
comparison is not necessarily revealing of Chip’s reasons for the adverse action.
Still, at the prima facie stage, this might not trouble us—the work that
comparison does here, at most, is to make an opening suggestion that Chip
fired me for an impermissible reason; it need not be treated as conclusive
proof.
But, as we move through the burden-shifting process, we ought to consider
what additional work, if any, we allow the comparison to do. Or, put another
way, the question is whether (and why) we treat the comparison as probative
at all. Taking the case to the next stage, imagine that Chip offered a
nondiscriminatory reason for firing me—he disliked my sense of humor or my
commitment to my schoolwork. And suppose I offered evidence in response
that he laughed heartily at my jokes and repeated them to others and had given
me the same congratulatory ice cream cake for doing well at school that he had
given to my male ice cream scooping peers. Then what? I have arguably shown
not only that his reasons for the firing were not credible, but also that they
were pretexts for discrimination.
At this point, we might say that the set of possible reasons for Chip’s
actions has been narrowed even further, to the point that we will treat sex
discrimination as the likely reason for his firing me.155 But, again, comparison
is the “closer” on my discrimination claim only if we are willing to impute
discriminatory intent to Chip’s comparatively worse treatment of me relative to
my male coworkers. The governing law says that we can; although the doctrine
would not mandate a determination that Chip discriminated,156 my evidence
would allow a factfinder to hold that Chip had discriminated against me.

155.

Cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (“[O]nce the
employer’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely
alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the
actual reason for its decision.”).

156.

St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 511 (holding that a court’s “rejection of the [employer]’s
proffered reasons” for its actions does not entitle a plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law).
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Yet if we could peer into Chip’s mind, we might have learned that his
dislike was rooted in my particular ambitions for college (which were different
from those of my also-college-bound scooping peers) rather than in my being
female.157 Comparison, seen in this light, was helpful for showing that Chip
saw me differently from how he saw my peers158 but was misleading to the
extent that we read more into it than that. In other words, while the
comparison can reliably narrow the set of reasons for Chip’s actions, we choose
to infer that Chip acted “because of sex.” The comparator analysis itself does
not require that interpretation of the facts.
Two interrelated observations follow. The first is simply that, as suggested
above, comparators are a valuable filtering device, in that we can be reasonably
confident in their ability to shrink the set of possible explanations for an
employer’s action. The second is that comparators are imperfect filtering
devices; they are not a clear, or necessarily reliable, window into discriminatory
intent.
Although some might say that this imperfection of fit should lead us to
abandon comparators altogether, that is not my suggestion. It is always the
case that circumstantial evidence requires a factfinder to draw inferences about
intent rather than guaranteeing certainty.159 And it is always the case that,
unless we limit discrimination claims to situations where employers admit that
they acted because of an employee’s protected characteristic, we must draw
from circumstances. Consequently, to the extent that we recognize
discrimination even when an employer denies having discriminated and
require plaintiffs to prove an employer’s discriminatory intent, comparators are
among our best resources.160
The point, instead, is that comparators themselves neither provide
definitive insight into employers’ motives nor inevitably compel conclusions
regarding whether an employer acted because of an employee’s protected trait,
as courts often suggest they do. Instead, the comparator’s revelation of

157.

As the Court explained in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, “In saying that gender played a
motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the
moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of
those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.” 490 U.S. 228, 250
(1989).

158.

As a potential additional virtue, the comparator framework may encourage employers to be
more explicit and comprehensive about the grounds for their actions and their agents’
actions to protect against adverse inferences.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.

159.
160.
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Still, the imperfections of such an approach raise interesting questions about why the courts
treat comparison as confidently as they do. I consider these questions below.
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discriminatory intent rests on a set of assumptions about both the similarity of
the complainant and the comparator and the baseline rationality of employers.
For the comparator’s probative work to be assessed properly, relative to other
methodologies, those assumptions must be part of the conversation. The
comparator’s imperfections as a filtering device ought also to give us pause
with respect to the transformation of comparators from heuristic to substantive
law.
B. Comparators as Underinclusive
The comparator heuristic’s underinclusiveness should give us additional
cause to be dubious when courts treat comparators as the only or preeminent
method for illuminating discriminatory intent. Recall that the triggering
problem for discrimination law is the employer’s decision to take action
because of the trait. This means, again, that while the presence of a comparator
may help illuminate an employer’s reliance on a protected trait, the existence of
a better-off comparator is a byproduct of the discrimination rather than the
discrimination itself.
The Supreme Court made this point when considering the sex
discrimination claims of female security guards who alleged that the county
government running the jail where they worked intentionally paid them less
because they were female.161 In its defense, the county argued that
discrimination could have occurred only if the women had engaged in “equal
work” relative to the male guards.162 The Court was clear that the county’s
comparative conceptualization of discrimination was unduly constrained. “In
practical terms,” the Court wrote, restricting recognition to instances where
comparisons could be made would “mean[] that a woman who is
discriminatorily underpaid could obtain no relief—no matter how egregious
the discrimination might be—unless her employer also employed a man in an
equal job in the same establishment, at a higher rate of pay.”163 The Court
labeled this type of practice as “blatantly discriminatory,” recognizing that the
discrimination was rooted not in the comparison between men and women but
in the employer’s decision to underpay an employee because she is a woman.164

161.
162.
163.
164.

Cnty. of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
Id. at 177.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 179.
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Likewise, the Second Circuit observed:
If [an] employee were fired for a discriminatory reason, and no one was
hired to replace him, he could never demonstrate disparate treatment
because there is no point of comparison. . . . [I]t stands to reason that,
in such a case, the plaintiff should be able to create an inference of
discrimination . . . .165
Or imagine, returning to my ice cream scooping experience, that Chip fired
me because of my sex but did not replace me with another scooper. The
absence of a comparator would not change the fact that Chip treated me
adversely “because of sex.”
In other words, if we understand discrimination to mean adverse treatment
because of a protected trait, we ought to be able to find discrimination even
when comparison is not a meaningful possibility. It is no doubt true that,
without a comparator, the fact that an employer acted because of the
employee’s trait rather than for some other reason becomes more difficult to
see. But, to the extent we agree that the discrimination could have occurred,
our limitations in seeing discriminatory intent should prompt us to explore
other methodologies and perhaps rethink the way in which courts rely on
comparators as our best, or even exclusive, methodology.
C. Comparison and Disparate Impact
Interestingly, disparate impact theory and jurisprudence reinforce how
questionable the conceptual link is between comparators and proof of
discriminatory intent. Comparison is critical to disparate impact cases in that
the trait-based impact is ordinarily shown by comparing the effect of a rule or
policy on individuals with and without the protected trait at issue. So, for
example, in the Court’s recent ruling in Ricci v. DeStefano, the disparate impact
claim rested in part on a showing that the city’s decision not to rely on test
results had a comparatively adverse effect on white firefighters who would have
been promoted had the test results been counted.166

165.
166.
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Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001).
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). For other cases in which comparators are critical to demonstrating
disparate impact, see, for example, Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010), which
found that the plaintiff had made out a cognizable prima facie disparate impact claim by
showing that an employment practice affected African-Americans more negatively than
others; and Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 554 U.S. 84 (2008), which held that
a disparate impact claim requires plaintiffs to show that employment practices cause
statistical disparities between groups.
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Yet the point of comparative proof in Ricci and other disparate impact cases
is not to show the employer’s discriminatory intent but rather to highlight the
effect of the challenged decision. Indeed, courts do not draw an inference of
discriminatory intent from the comparatively adverse treatment. Instead, intent
in disparate impact cases is irrelevant to the analysis and, more deeply, to the
law’s concern in this area, which is to eradicate employer actions that have the
effect, if not the aim, of discriminating based on a protected trait.167 Thus,
while the primary focus here is on the overreliance on comparators in disparate
treatment cases, the additional evidence of a disconnect between comparators
and intent in the disparate impact context should cast further doubt on the
faith that courts place in comparators’ revelatory powers.
iv. context: a methodological alternative
Notwithstanding the dominance of comparators in much of the
employment discrimination jurisprudence, harassment and stereotyping case
law shows that the task of observing discrimination can be managed
successfully with other techniques and that discrimination is not centrally
defined by comparison. Indeed, although these cases are not often treated as
different in kind analytically from other discrimination cases, when seen
through a comparator lens it becomes clear that they are. While individual
employees might offer a comparator as part of their proof, the discrimination
claim is typically founded not on a comparison to coworkers but instead on the
harassing and/or stereotype-based interactions between the employee and
others in the workplace.
More specifically, in the harassment context, the employee will point to one
or more statements or acts by coworkers or supervisors that negatively affected
the employee’s work environment and had either an explicit or implicit
connection to the employee’s protected characteristic(s). A sexual harassment
plaintiff might indicate, for example, that a supervisor or coworker touched her
inappropriately or targeted her with sexually demeaning comments.
In the stereotyping cases, an individual will seek to show that an employer
treated him or her adversely because of stereotypes associated with the
individual’s protected characteristic(s). Here, the crux of the claim is typically
that the employer acted adversely based on doubts about the individual’s

167.

See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52-53 (2003) (noting that while disparate
treatment cases depend on an employer’s motivation for the challenged acts, disparate
impact cases do not).
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ability to perform the job at issue not because of merit but because of
stereotypes associated with the individual’s identity characteristic.
For both types of cases,168 courts discern discriminatory intent in the acts
and statements at issue by looking to all of the surrounding circumstances for
the ways in which the protected traits may have operated to affect employer
decisionmaking. Comparators may be present, but they are not decisive. For
this reason, these cases, and their application of a totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis, reinforce the claim here that comparators are best understood as one
among several observational tools rather than as a defining element without
which discrimination cannot occur. This Part first will trace the development
of the contextual methodology in discrimination cases involving stereotyping
and harassment, and then will consider the relationship of this method to the
work of comparators as a means for seeing discrimination.
A. The Emergence of the Contextual Model in Stereotyping and Harassment
Jurisprudence
The recognition that discriminatory intent could be discerned from
context, including an employer’s acts and statements, rather than from
comparison to other employees, initially took hold in the Supreme Court’s
sexual harassment jurisprudence. Indeed, in the Court’s first case to find that
harassing acts could themselves amount to discrimination, Meritor Savings

168.

It bears noting that harassment and stereotyping claims are not mutually exclusive. Indeed,
there are a number of cases in which employees have prevailed because the harassment they
experienced took the form of stereotyping linked to a protected characteristic. In Nichols v.
Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001), for example, a male waiter
was repeatedly harassed because his coworkers thought he was too effeminate. As the court
observed,
At its essence, the systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a belief that
Sanchez did not act as a man should act. Sanchez was attacked for walking and
carrying his tray “like a woman”—i.e., for having feminine mannerisms. Sanchez
was derided for not having sexual intercourse with a waitress who was his friend.
Sanchez’s male coworkers and one of his supervisors repeatedly reminded
Sanchez that he did not conform to their gender-based stereotypes, referring to
him as “she” and “her.” And, the most vulgar name-calling directed at Sanchez
was cast in female terms. We conclude that this verbal abuse was closely linked to
gender.
Id. at 874; see also Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (finding it “clear” that sexualized attacks on a gay man, “who was singled out from his
male coworkers” for hostile treatment, stated a sex discrimination claim).
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Bank v. Vinson, comparators were but one option on a long list of techniques
for discerning discriminatory intent.169
In Meritor, the Court addressed whether a bank supervisor, who had acted
in sexually aggressive ways toward the plaintiff, had acted “because of sex”
rather than for some other reason by looking to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s guidelines. Those guidelines identified
“[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature” as sexual harassment and, separately,
defined sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.170 Yet the Court also
made clear that not all such advances and conduct would amount to
discrimination; instead, only “sufficiently severe and pervasive” acts would
warrant remediation under the statute.171
But neither of these points, by itself, shows that the sexualized conduct was
“because of sex” rather than for some other reason. Indeed, the Court has since
reiterated that sexualized harassment is not necessarily harassment “because of
sex” within the meaning of Title VII.172 As Justice Scalia observed for a

169.

170.

The central question was whether a sexually harassed litigant needed to show additional
adverse action by the employer, such as demotion or termination, to state a discrimination
claim. The Court held she did not. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)
(“Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.”). Both in Meritor
and subsequently, the Court recognized that racially harassing acts can likewise create a
hostile and discriminatory environment. See id. at 66-67; see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 n.10 (2002) (“Hostile work environment claims based on racial
harassment are reviewed under the same standard as those based on sexual harassment.”).
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.

171.

See id. at 67 (“[The] ‘mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive
feelings in an employee’ would not affect the conditions of employment to [a] sufficiently
significant degree to violate Title VII.” (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1972))). “For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive
‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
904 (11th Cir. 1982)); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)
(“[I]t is important to separate significant from trivial harms. Title VII, we have said, does
not set forth ‘a general civility code for the American workplace.’” (quoting Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998))); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (stating that judicial standards for sexual harassment must “filter
out complaints attacking ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic
use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing’” (quoting BARBARA
LINDEMANN & DAVID KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 175 (1992))).

172.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); see also David S.
Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1748-58 (2002) (observing that modern academics and courts have
questioned the assumption that sexual harassment occurs “because of sex”).
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unanimous court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, “We have never held
that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is
automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used
have sexual content or connotations.”173 Still, even while characterizing “the
critical issue” in a comparative manner—that “members of one sex [be]
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed”—comparators were last on the
Court’s list of methods of seeing the link between the adverse act and the
protected characteristic.174 The more prominent and “easy” methods, according
to the Court, involved consideration of the harassing statements and actions
themselves,175 as well as the defendant’s sexual orientation.176
The larger point, as the Court explained, is that observing discrimination in
a workplace requires consideration of not only “the words used or the physical
acts performed” but also “a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships.”177 In short, what matters for seeing

173.

Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.

174.

Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring));
see also id. at 80-81 (“A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct
comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a
mixed-sex workplace.”).

175.

Id. at 80 (“A trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female
victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it
clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the
workplace.”).

176.

On the relevance of a defendant’s sexual orientation, the Court stated:
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most
male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged conduct
typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable
to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex.
The same chain of inference would be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex
harassment, if there were credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual. But
harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference
of discrimination on the basis of sex.
Id.

177.

Id. at 82. See also, e.g., Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The mere fact
that men and women are both exposed to the same offensive circumstances on the job
site . . . does not mean that, as a matter of law, their work conditions are necessarily equally
harsh. The objective hostility of a work environment depends on the totality of the
circumstances.”); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1063 (7th Cir.
2003) (rejecting a discrimination claim after “consider[ing], as in any sex harassment case,
the ‘social context in which the particular behavior occurs’” (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at
81)).
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discrimination is context, with comparison being but one technique among
several for making that contextual evaluation.178
The use of this type of contextual but noncomparative evaluation to
observe identity-based discrimination can also be seen outside the employment
context. In finding that Georgia’s segregated confinement of mentally disabled
patients amounted to discrimination “by reason of” disability,179 for example,
the Court in Olmstead v. Zimring rejected outright the need for a comparator. It
declared instead that it could observe discrimination by analyzing the
segregating act in context, similar to its approach in the harassment cases.
Specifically, the Court rested its “[r]ecognition that unjustified institutional
isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination” on two
observations—one related to the expressive meaning of isolation and the other
related to the harm caused to those isolated:
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit
from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that
persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life. Second, confinement in an institution severely
diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family
relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence,
educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.180
In short, the Court saw that the segregation of mentally disabled
individuals was discrimination because of disability not by comparing the act
to the treatment of others, but instead by looking more broadly at the
segregating act’s social meaning and its injurious effect.181

178.

This could be characterized as a Bayesian approach to evidence. One might also argue that
the Court in Meritor deployed a hypothetical comparator by imagining, in effect, a man who
would not have been subject to the same conduct as the female plaintiff. If that is the case,
there is no mention of that analytic move by the Court. Further, the “opposite-sex”
hypothetical comparator provides little help in understanding the Court’s analysis in the
same-sex harassment context, where the Court, as in Oncale, did not give any indication that
it was imagining that a female worker on the offshore oil platform where Joseph Oncale was
harassed would not also have been subject to harassment.

179.

Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598 (1999).
Id. at 600-01 (internal citations omitted); see also City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (“In forbidding employers to discriminate against
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” (quoting Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))).

180.

181.

Notably, although Congress had specified this type of segregation as discriminatory, the
Court did not simply rest on the statute’s findings, which “identified unjustified
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The importance of contextual evidence of discrimination, rather than
comparator evidence, can be seen in stereotyping cases as well. In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, for example, the Court found that the accounting firm
had discriminated impermissibly by relying on sex stereotypes to deny
partnership to Ann Hopkins.182 Although Hopkins had offered evidence of how
male partnership candidates had been treated, the Court noted specifically the
district court’s finding that she did not have an adequate comparator. There
were male candidates who lacked the interpersonal skills that Hopkins had also
been accused of lacking, but they were not sufficiently comparable because they
“possessed other, positive traits that Hopkins lacked.”183 Instead, the Court
looked to the sex-stereotyped remarks made about Hopkins to find that the
firm had acted “because of” sex. These included the observation by some
partners at the firm that she was “macho,” that she “overcompensated for
being a woman,” that she should “take a course at charm school,” and that, “to
improve her chances for partnership . . . [she] should ‘walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry.’”184
In an approach endorsed by others on the Court,185 the plurality treated its
observation of stereotyping remarks as equivalent to observing discriminatory
intent directly, writing simply that “stereotyped remarks can certainly be
evidence that gender played a part” in an employer’s decision.186 Although

‘segregation’ of persons with disabilities as a ‘for[m] of discrimination,’” but, as illustrated,
explained and justified that determination. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101(a)(2), (5) (2006)).
182.
183.
184.
185.

186.

784

490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 236.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring) (“I agree that the finding [of sex discrimination] was
supported by the record.”); id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the
plurality that “on the facts presented in this case,” Hopkins had showed that the firm relied
adversely on her sex in its partnership decision); id. at 265 (“Congress was certainly not
blind to the stigmatic harm which comes from being evaluated by a process which treats one
as an inferior by reason of one’s race or sex.”). Even the dissenters agreed that “Hopkins
plainly presented a strong case . . . of the presence of discrimination in Price Waterhouse’s
partnership process” and that “[e]vidence of use by decisionmakers of sex stereotypes is, of
course, quite relevant to the question of discriminatory intent.” Id. at 294, 295 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 251; see also id. (“As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group.”). Further, the Court explained why stereotypes
violate Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition: “An employer who objects to
aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an
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Hopkins had introduced expert testimony to show, through social
psychological theory, that these and other comments should properly be seen
as sex stereotyping, the plurality characterized that testimony as “merely icing
on Hopkins’ cake.”187 Making its observation of discrimination sound
straightforward, the plurality observed that “[i]t takes no special training to
discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as
requiring ‘a course at charm school.’”188
The Court was clear that stereotyped remarks themselves do not necessarily
show that impermissible discrimination has occurred. Instead, the employee
who has alleged discrimination “must show that the employer actually relied
on her gender in making its decision.”189 But, most significant for our
purposes, the remarks can help make that showing because they are treated as
exposing the employer’s intent to act because of the employee’s protected
characteristic.190
B. Acts, Statements, and Automaticity
In essence, the Court, through its “no special training” comments,
suggested that drawing the link between acts, statements, and discriminatory
intent is undemanding, if not automatic. Yet much like the overstated faith in
the comparator heuristic, this characterization also implies that acts and
statements themselves do more work than they actually do to establish that an
employer has acted because of a protected trait.
Justice O’Connor’s commentary in Price Waterhouse is illustrative of the
way in which courts frequently gloss over the difficulties associated with
discerning discriminatory intent from stereotyping statements. As she
explained, not every statement regarding an employee’s sex necessarily

intolerable and impermissible catch-22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a
job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.” Id.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 256.
Id.
Id. at 251.
See also Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, 579 F.3d 285, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2009) (putting comments
made to the plaintiff-employee in context and finding those comments sufficient to state a
sex stereotyping claim); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 3d 293, 303-05 (D.D.C. 2008)
(finding, in context, that an employer’s comments about the plaintiff themselves amounted
to sex stereotyping).
Some would argue that courts are comfortable turning to context where stereotyping or
harassing incidents have occurred because those incidents are more easily understood than
other occurrences, as described in the cases in Part II, supra, to signal the presence of
discriminatory intent. I address this point infra at text accompanying notes 264-265.
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demonstrates sex stereotyping and, therefore, discriminatory intent. “[A] mere
reference to ‘a lady candidate’ might show that gender ‘played a role’ in the
decision,” she wrote, “but by no means could support a rational factfinder’s
inference that the decision was made ‘because of’ sex.”191 For Justice O’Connor,
this understanding followed from the point that “[r]ace and gender always
‘play a role’ in an employment decision in the benign sense that these are
human characteristics of which decisionmakers are aware and about which they
may comment in a perfectly neutral and nondiscriminatory fashion.”192
Yet distinguishing the comments that reveal discriminatory intent from
those that do not is neither as easy nor as obvious as the comments of Justice
O’Connor and other members of the Court seem to suggest.193 While Justice
O’Connor did not find the “lady candidate” reference troublesome, others,
including Hopkins’s expert witness, could make a strong case that the reference
showed that the firm’s treatment of Hopkins was centrally shaped by her being
a woman to the point that the very way in which they identified Hopkins
focused on her being female. Likewise, although the majority in Olmstead
deemed it “evident” that the act of segregating mentally disabled individuals
amounted to discrimination,194 the dissent found it equally evident that no
discrimination had occurred.195
Indeed, a central claim of second-generation theories is that discriminatory
intent is often missed in precisely the sort of “lady candidate” statement that
Justice O’Connor dismissed as nonprobative. As discussed earlier, for example,
many courts would not see race discrimination in the refusal to promote the
“fifth black woman” even if the nonpromoted woman could identify negative
comments about her African-style clothing or her black church choir

191.
192.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277.
Id.

193.

Indeed, as suggested earlier, it is this difficulty that, outside of the stereotyping and
harassment cases, drives courts to embrace comparator evidence so strongly.

194.

Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999).
Id. at 623 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s analysis as “fly[ing] in the
face” of the Court’s precedent). We can see similar disagreement over the link between sexbased rules and stereotyping in Nguyen v. INS, where Justice O’Connor, in dissent, had no
difficulty concluding that a rule favoring mothers over fathers for purposes of conferring
U.S. citizenship on foreign-born children was rooted in impermissible sex stereotypes, while
a majority of the Court found the sex-based distinction to be perfectly legitimate. Compare
533 U.S. 53, 74-97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), with 533 U.S. at 56-73 (majority
opinion). For further discussion of the ways in which the majority and dissenting opinions
in Nguyen interpreted the same facts differently and, consequently, reached different
conclusions about the constitutionality of the challenged rule, see Goldberg, Constitutional
Tipping Points, supra note 30, at 1970-74.
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membership, so long as her four African-American peers were promoted.196
Yet as Carbado and Gulati suggest, when examined closely, those sorts of
comments reflect the same sort of racial stereotyping that is seen more easily in
other settings.197
In other words, a case like Price Waterhouse may be easy because the Court
“gets” the link between sexism and statements about a partnership candidate
being too macho. Likewise, the Court may have little difficulty finding that an
employer’s use of the word “boy” when talking to African-American employees
suggests the presence of discriminatory intent.198 But there is nothing inherent
in harassing acts and stereotyping statements in general that makes their
underlying discriminatory intent fundamentally easier to unmask than the
discriminatory intent that might underlie other types of adverse treatment.
Instead, it is agreement (or presumed agreement) on the social meaning of
those acts and statements, when considered through a contextual lens, that
renders the cases easy for courts to decide. Consequently the “easy”
characterization should be understood as describing the Court’s comfort level
with finding discriminatory intent in particular acts or statements, and not as
suggesting that observing discriminatory intent is any more automatic in the
stereotyping and harassment contexts than it is through comparisons.
C. Reconsidering Comparators in Light of the Contextually Focused Stereotyping
and Harassment Jurisprudence
Recall Justice Thomas’s assertion that a conceptualization of discrimination
that does not require a comparison is “nonsensical”199 and “drains the term of

196.

Cf. Jesperson v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(presenting differing views in majority and dissenting opinions as to whether a policy
requiring female employees to wear makeup constituted sex stereotyping); Zalewska v.
Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 323 (2d Cir. 2003) (declining to give credence to the
“stereotype[]” that a woman wearing pants is dressed “more masculinely”); Weinstock v.
Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 44-45 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that labels such as “nice” and
“nurturing” used to describe a female professor were insufficient as a matter of law to
demonstrate sexually discriminatory intent).

197.

See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 21, at 1279-93. Again, even readers who reject either the
premise of identity performance theory or the view that discrimination law embodies the
theory’s premise may benefit from seeing that the easy identification of discrimination in
some acts and statements but not others is not because those acts and statements are
different in kind but rather because there is more general consensus about discriminatory
intent underlying some acts and statements than there is about others.

198.

See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006).
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 618 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

199.
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any meaning other than as a proxy for decisions disapproved of by this
Court.”200 Specifically, Justice Thomas suggested that “no principle” could
“limit[] this new species of ‘discrimination’ claim . . . because it looks merely to
an individual in isolation, without comparing him to otherwise similarly
situated persons, and determines that discrimination occurs merely because
that individual does not receive the treatment he wishes to receive.”201
If it is correct that discrimination exists only where an individual can show
a comparator in a better-off position, then we ought to be able to locate this
type of comparison within the harassment and stereotyping jurisprudence. If
not, we ought to ask whether Justice Thomas’s concerns about the potential
lack of a limiting principle for a noncomparative discrimination analysis
undermine the validity of the contextual method for observing discrimination.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth reiterating that Justice Thomas’s
constrained conceptualization of discrimination did not capture majority
support when he advanced it in Olmstead and that his approach conflicts with
the Court’s harassment and stereotyping decisions discussed above. Moreover,
comparison is arguably counterproductive as a means for illuminating, let
alone defining, discrimination where an employer singles out an employee for
harassment or stereotyping because of a protected trait. In these kinds of cases,
an employee can often show that others outside his or her protected group
were not treated adversely, but the employer can likewise show that some
within the protected group were not treated adversely either. At that point, the
comparison no more allows for an inference of discriminatory intent based on a
protected characteristic than for an inference that something else particular to
the employee had provoked the employer’s actions.
Yet, as discussed above, it is long settled that when an employer targets one
employee for adverse treatment from among others who share the same
protected trait, discrimination can be found. Despite Justice Scalia’s having
joined Justice Thomas’s opinion in Olmstead, it was Scalia’s own opinion in
Oncale that made this point by allowing a man to bring a sexual harassment
claim based on the activities of other men in a workplace where no women
were present.202 Even Justice Kennedy, who agreed with Justice Thomas’s

200.

Id. at 624.

201.

Id.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77, 79-80 (1998). On the question
whether ideas of comparison are embedded in conceptualizations of sexual harassment,
Katherine Franke has observed that “sexual harassment is a kind of sex discrimination not
because the conduct would not have been undertaken if the victim had been a different
sex . . . but precisely because . . . . it perpetuates, enforces, and polices a set of gender norms

202.
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insistence on comparators, did not fully embrace the limited scope for
discrimination law that Justice Thomas advanced. Instead, he specifically
“put[] aside issues of animus or unfair stereotype” when expressing his
support for a comparison-based methodology, suggesting, in effect, that the
presence of either could render the comparison-driven analysis unnecessary.203
All of this reinforces that while comparators are one acceptable mode of
exposing discrimination, they are certainly not, conceptually or doctrinally, a
categorical requirement. Yet the question remains whether courts, by finding
discrimination absent a comparative showing, are misusing discrimination law
to mandate their own preferred code of conduct per Justice Thomas’s view.
The very suggestion that comparator-based discrimination findings are
objective while noncomparative analyses are subjective significantly overstates
the differences between these methods for discerning discrimination, creating a
false and unhelpfully dichotomous analysis. As discussed earlier, observing
discrimination through comparators is no more automatic than through these
other means. The determination that a comparator is adequate (or inadequate)
for purposes of illuminating discriminatory intent arguably effectuates the
subjective preferences of courts at least as much as the finding of
discrimination through an examination of acts or statements. So while it is true
that making a contextual determination about which acts or statements reveal
impermissible discrimination requires judgment calls or assumptions by the
court, so too does the application of the comparator analysis.
Indeed, the suggestion that discrimination can truly be seen only via
comparators and that all other non-comparison-based discrimination findings
amount to policy judgments is reminiscent of a decades-old debate about the
underpinnings of equality guarantees. Prompting that debate was the
argument, advanced by Peter Westen, that equality was both “empty” and
“entirely ‘[c]ircular’” because similar treatment could be required only for
those deemed to be sufficiently similar.204 Others quickly responded with a

203.

204.

that seek to feminize women and masculinize men.” Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong
with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 696 (1997).
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 611 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy observed that “[a]t the
outset it should be noted there is no allegation that Georgia officials acted on the basis of
animus or unfair stereotypes regarding the disabled,” id., and argued that “absent a showing
of policies motivated by improper animus or stereotypes, it would be necessary to show that
a comparable or similarly situated group received different treatment,” id. at 613.
Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547-51 (1982). Westen argues
that:
Equality is an empty vessel with no substantive moral content of its own.
Without moral standards, equality remains meaningless, a formula that can have
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range of theories to suggest that the equality guarantee did indeed have
valuable content.205 Yet, however forcefully advocated, each of these positions
necessarily rested on the premise that substantive judgments and assumptions
were required to give equality its content.206
Likewise, the process of observing discrimination necessarily requires
judgments about whatever circumstantial forms of evidence we are
considering—whether comparisons, harassing acts, or stereotyping
statements—as well as decisions about which discrimination theories to
embrace. As shown earlier, choices about which comparisons will be treated as
exposing discrimination and which will not, just like the choices about which
acts and statements are because of a protected trait and which are not, are just
that—choices. None is more mechanical or automatic than the other.
Because these choices are thus essential to evaluating any circumstantial
evidence, comparators provide false certainty to the extent that they are treated
as elemental to, or objectively confirmatory of, discrimination. In turn, this
false certainty enables courts to elide accountability (1) for their decisions to
require comparators in the first place; and (2) for their dispositive judgments
regarding the scope of acceptable comparators and the diminished value of
other non-comparator-based evidence. The contextual evaluation, by contrast,
gives greater exposure to the choices that courts make regarding their theory of
discrimination and the relationship of workplace evidence to that theory. This
is because the doctrine insists that a connection be established between the

nothing to say about how we should act. With such standards, equality becomes
superfluous, a formula that can do nothing but repeat what we already know.
Id. at 547 (footnote omitted).
205.

See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of
Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1983) (urging that an “equality-of-respect” model
reflects the best substantive understanding of the equal protection guarantee); Kent
Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1184-85 (1983)
(arguing that the principle of equality has been central to advancement of greater political
rights and social opportunities); Karst, supra note 33, at 279-80 (maintaining that equality
rhetoric has substantive effect on legal rights and political culture); Kenneth W. Simons,
Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387, 389 (1985) (“A right to equal treatment
is a comparative claim to receive a particular treatment just because another person or class
receives it.”).

206.

See Finley, supra note 33, at 1144. Discussing Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1711 (1976), Finley writes, “Kennedy’s insight is
that there is no determinate, coherent way to choose between . . . formal equality or
substantive equality. Inevitably, the choice depends on our sets of values and visions of
society.” Finley, supra note 33, at 1144 n.113. Finley adds that “[t]here is no way, within the
doctrinal framework itself, to tell us when we should adopt the approach of formal equality,
and when a substantive equality approach is called for. Instead, we must appeal to deeply
political conceptions of what values and type of society we wish to foster.” Id.
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protected characteristic and the acts or statements at issue.207 Of course, as
illustrated by Price Waterhouse, where courts find that connection to be easy or
obvious, they may move quickly or automatically from the acts or statements to
a finding of discrimination.208 But even in those circumstances, the move is
there for all to see, whereas the comparator framework provides cover for
courts’ similar judgments and the resulting jurisprudential inhibition of all but
the most formalistic antidiscrimination norms and theories.
v. judicial legitimacy and the sticking power of
comparators
At this point we have seen that comparators are not the only means for
seeing discrimination and that, by design (or at least in a typical application),
there are serious limitations to the discrimination that comparators can reach.
Yet comparators remain dominant to the point that discrimination lawsuits
typically cannot be won without them.
This Part explores the reasons for comparators’ sticking power, and aims
both to explain why such an imperfect means for observing and defining
discrimination has achieved dominance and to understand the possibilities for
new methodologies going forward. My central claim is that comparators have
gained their status because their empirical appearance enables courts to
accommodate a primary legitimacy concern that plagues judicial intervention
on issues related to identity and a subsidiary concern related to employer
autonomy. That is, comparators offer a seemingly bright-line framework for
identifying elusive facts and resolving complex social judgments even though a
flexible framework would be more appropriate.
A. The Legitimacy Concerns at Play
The prospect of a free-form, or even relatively unstructured, inquiry into
workplace behaviors related to individual identity taps directly into the
legitimacy- and capacity-protecting inclination exhibited by many courts to
avoid tasks that have the cast of a sociological inquiry.209 This antisociological

207.

208.
209.

In addition to its value in terms of judicial accountability, the contextual evaluation also
adds substantive value by exposing, and possibly avoiding, the diminishment of
antidiscrimination norms effected by the comparator heuristic. See supra note 33.
See supra text accompanying notes 182-188.
For extended development of this point, see Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points, supra
note 30; and Goldberg, Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist Arguments, supra note 30.
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bent can be seen, for example, in the Court’s turn to visible markers such as
ancestral lineage and surnames210 when defining identity categories, rather
than to the more complex and contested social norms that are widely
understood, even by the Court, to contribute importantly to the content of
these categories.211 It can be seen as well in the way that the Court cites
changed factual understandings about a social group rather than
acknowledging changed social norms when invalidating restrictions on groupmember rights previously accepted as legitimate.212
The basic idea is that while courts may be well equipped to sift among
empirical facts, they are less institutionally suited, both in terms of training and
resources, for deep investigation and analysis of social norms. Consequently,
however attentive they may be to trends in social stances regarding an issue or

210.

211.

212.
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We might point to similar reasons to explain courts’ turn to discrimination as the legal
framework for evaluating sexual harassment, rather than dignity, which is the more
common approach within European law. As Gabrielle Friedman and James Whitman have
observed, “For Americans . . . the concept of ‘dignity’ often remains unconquerably vague,
unfillable with meaningful content. . . . It is ‘discrimination’ that seems the hard concept in
America, the concept with real content.” Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The
European Transformation of Harassment Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 241, 268 (2003).
See, e.g., Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 (1987) (relying on an early
nineteenth-century definition of race “continued series of descendants from a parent who is
called the stock”) (internal citation omitted); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 n.12
(1954) (“[J]ust as persons of a different race are distinguished by color, these Spanish
[sur]names provide ready identification of the members of this class.”). These same themes
can be traced through lower court decisions. See, e.g., Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529,
540 (Cal. 1971) (identifying race and lineage as “immutable trait[s], a status into which the
class members are locked by the accident of birth”); Hernandez v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
558 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (characterizing lineage and race as “classifications
based upon unalterable traits”). But see Commonwealth v. Rico, 711 A.2d 990, 994 (Pa.
1998) (“The mere spelling of a person’s surname is insufficient to show that he or she
belongs to a particular ethnic group.”).
Kenji Yoshino has written in the equal protection context about the way in which a
trait’s “visibility” enhances the likelihood for heightened judicial review of trait-based
classifications. See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 496-98 (1998). He
described this visibility as “the perceptibility of traits such as skin color that manifest
themselves on the physical body in a relatively permanent and recognizable way.” Id. at 497.
See, e.g., Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 610-11 (cataloguing dictionaries and encyclopedias
that discuss the socially constructed nature of race); Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 587
(7th Cir. 2008) (describing “‘race’” as “a fuzzy term”).
See Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points, supra note 30, at 1998-99 (citing Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 610 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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a particular social group,213 courts are more likely to register that awareness
through commentary about observable facts than through a sociologically
framed analysis. While the latter might be more accurate and candid, it also
would leave courts more vulnerable to charges that they are acting beyond their
capacity and using their powers to institutionalize their own social views into
legal mandates.214
In addition, courts tend to be especially wary of appearing to be hyperregulators of the workplace given the background commitments, both
ideological and doctrinal, that typically favor employer autonomy. Because
discrimination law carves out an exception to the general tolerance for bad
workplace behavior,215 including “low-grade” discrimination,216 courts have a
strong interest in avoiding the appearance that they are deploying the law in
ways that infringe on employers’ well-established prerogatives to govern their
workplaces as they like.217

213.

214.

215.

216.

217.

Cf. Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer’s Clear Mistake, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 272 (1993) (“Mr.
Dooley’s dictum about the Supreme Court’s tendency to follow the election returns seems
no less apt today than when it was first printed almost a century ago.”); Barry Friedman,
Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2606 (2003) (“[J]udicial
decisions rest within a range of acceptability to a majority of the people.”).
Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points, supra note 30, at 1999; cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1233, 1241 (2004) (identifying a similar concern as a reason for the Court’s avoidance of
explicit morals-based rationales for government action).
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (addressing the “risk”
that Title VII might function as “a general civility code for the American workplace”); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (explaining that Title VII “eliminates
certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving employers’
freedom of choice” and describing the Court’s task as drawing a “balance between employee
rights and employer prerogatives”).
By “low-grade” discrimination, I mean the discriminatory acts that the law has been
construed not to prohibit. In the sexual harassment context, for example, the Court has
reinforced that Title VII “forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the
‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. See also id. (“‘Conduct that
is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is
beyond Title VII’s purview.’” (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993))).
For a discussion of the historical development of the at-will employment doctrine in
America, which arguably has influenced contemporary views about judicial deference to
employer autonomy, see Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The
Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 66 (2000) (identifying at-will
employment as a “fundamental assumption [that] has shaped our labor law”). Cf. Deborah
A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653
(2000) (arguing that the expansion of modern tort law is gradually eviscerating at-will
employment in America); Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will
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B. The Comparator Heuristic’s Legitimizing Work
The comparator heuristic, as it is used by most courts, accommodates both
of these concerns because it gives the appearance that the facts of differential
treatment, rather than the courts’ own assumptions and judgments, are doing
the work to show that trait-based discrimination has occurred and that, as
required by the applicable discrimination law, the court must intervene. That
is, if the comparison reveals that an employee with X characteristic was treated
differently from the similarly situated employee without X characteristic, the
resulting inference of discriminatory intent is treated as the comparison’s
logical, natural product.218
The comparison thus has an empirical cast to it—it documents, from facts,
the different treatment and, by implication, the discriminatory intent. Given
the pressures created by courts’ general orientation to avoid the sociological
role and the undue disruption of employer prerogatives, the comparator
heuristic provides comfort by appearing to produce “hard” evidence of
discrimination. Put another way, the inference of discriminatory intent
becomes less superficially vulnerable, at least from the vantage point of the
judicial-legitimacy concerns just described, to the extent that it is presented as
resting on facts rather than on the court’s subjective judgments about a
workplace. Yet, as discussed above, comparators produce results regarding the
presence of discriminatory intent that are surely false. Further, by failing to
specify the results’ underlying subjectivity, they obscure the absence of judicial
accountability for the analytic choices and assumptions made.
The contextual methodology for gleaning discriminatory intent from
stereotyping and harassing acts might seem to be in tension with these
legitimacy concerns because it lacks the comparators’ ability to produce “facts.”
As applied, however, courts find other ways to suggest that it is the workplace
context, rather than their own judgment, that is shedding light on the presence
or absence of discrimination. Recall that in the stereotyping and harassment
contexts, courts have stressed that linking workplace conduct to a protected

218.
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World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1655 (1996) (“The employer’s presumptive right to fire
employees at will—for good reason, for bad reason, or for no reason at all—has been
drastically cut back in the last sixty years. . . . The at-will rule now coexists with numerous
important exceptions—statutory and common law, state and federal—that prohibit . . . .
discrimination based on race, sex, age, or other characteristics.”).
Of course, as shown earlier, a court’s choices as to how tight a fit to demand between the
plaintiff and the comparator are contestable. But once those choices have been made, there
can be no denying the difference in treatment, should one exist.
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characteristic neither requires “special training” nor presents great difficulties.
Put in legitimacy terms, then, the facts appear to be doing the work.
Of course, as discussed above, not all harassing acts or stereotyping
statements can be linked to a protected trait and treated as discriminatory.219
But, from a legitimacy standpoint, if the context reveals acts or statements that
are widely assumed to reflect discriminatory intent, the Court need not expend
reputational capital to find the presence of discrimination. We see this, for
example, in cases where courts have little difficulty finding statements that
mothers should not work outside the home while raising young children to be
sex-related220 or that calling an African-American man a “boy” can be racially
derogatory.221

219.

220.

The debates among experts about whether Wal-Mart stereotyped and then discriminated
against its female employees underscore this point. Cf. John Monahan, Laurens Walker &
Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social
Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1742-43 (2008) (identifying the sex discrimination case of
Dukes v. Wal-Mart as a landmark case for “the use of social science research on stereotyping
to support claims for relief in employment discrimination [lawsuits]”). This is apart from
the question whether the acts and statements are sufficiently harmful to exceed the tolerance
for low-grade discrimination.
In applying Price Waterhouse to a family responsibilities discrimination suit, for example, the
Second Circuit recently rejected an employer’s argument that disparaging comments about a
woman’s commitment to work after having children could not be treated as sex-based
“without comparative evidence of what was said about fathers.” Back v. Hastings on
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004). The statements included
inquiries as to how the plaintiff was “planning on spacing [her] offspring,” requests that the
plaintiff “not get pregnant until [her supervisor] retire[d],” suggestions that the plaintiff
“wait until [her son] was in kindergarten to have another child,” and statements that it was
“‘not possible for [the plaintiff] to be a good mother and have this job.’” Id. at 115 (first and
fourth alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court found
specifically that no such comparison was required to see discriminatory intent. Instead, “the
notions that mothers are insufficiently devoted to work, and that work and motherhood are
incompatible, are properly considered to be, themselves, gender-based.” Id. at 121. Invoking
Price Waterhouse, the court added that “stereotypical remarks about the incompatibility of
motherhood and employment ‘can certainly be evidence that gender played a part’ in an
employment decision,” and that, therefore, “stereotyping of women as caregivers can by
itself and without more be evidence of an impermissible, sex-based motive.” Id. at 122
(quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 480 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)). The court identified other
circuit courts in agreement that these types of comments support a finding of discriminatory
intent. See, e.g., Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir.
2000) (holding that a direct supervisor’s “specifically question[ing] whether [the plaintiff]
would be able to manage her work and family responsibilities” supported a finding of
discriminatory animus, where the plaintiff’s employment was terminated shortly
thereafter); Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding, in a
Pregnancy Discrimination Act case, that a reasonable jury could have concluded that “a
supervisor’s statement to a woman known to be pregnant that she was being fired so that
she could ‘spend more time at home with her children’ reflected unlawful motivations
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Comparators become important, then, in situations where the challenged
conduct is not easily or obviously recognized, per these social understandings,
as embodying discriminatory intent or, more colloquially, as speaking for itself.
In these cases, comparators’ empirical overtones suggest that the inquiry
involves more than just the subjective preferences of a particular court, which
Justice Thomas derided in response to the noncomparative analysis in
Olmstead.222 Consider the Court’s early pregnancy cases in this light. The
comparison of pregnant and nonpregnant people did not produce facts
showing that the challenged rules restricting pregnancy benefits were “based
on sex.”223 Indeed, the Court in Gilbert wrote that it needed only the most
“cursory” analysis to reach that conclusion.224 Had the Court wanted to “see”
discriminatory intent in that distinction, it would have needed a source other
than the comparator to do so. At the time, however, the Court may have sensed
there was not widespread agreement on the connection between pregnancyrelated restrictions and sex discrimination. Consequently, without a
comparator or easy connection between the employer’s acts and discriminatory
intent, the majority seemed to suggest that a finding of sex discrimination
would have reflected its subjective sensibilities rather than its objective
judgment, thereby undermining its legitimacy.225

221.

because it invoked widely understood stereotypes the meaning of which is hard to
mistake”).
See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006). On remand, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed its earlier determination that “the [‘boy’] comments were ambiguous stray remarks
. . . and are not sufficient circumstantial evidence of bias” to sustain the plaintiff’s race
discrimination claim. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 08-16135, 2010 WL 3244920, at *13 (11th
Cir. Aug. 17, 2010) (alternation in original).

222.

See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 624 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The
Court showed its sensitivity to this type of critique while allowing a non-comparison-based
sex discrimination challenge to the compensation of the female prison guards in County of
Washington v. Gunther, emphasizing that the discrimination inquiry did not “require a court
to make its own subjective assessment of the value of the male and female guard jobs.” 452
U.S. 161, 181 (1981).

223.

Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976).
Id.

224.
225.
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The dissenters, by contrast, would have located sexually discriminatory intent in the
pregnancy classification following the same model that the Court has used since for linking
stereotyping and harassment to discriminatory intent. They stated that nothing more than
“common sense” was necessary to see the link between the two. Id. at 149 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]t offends common sense to suggest that a classification revolving around
pregnancy is not, at the minimum, strongly ‘sex related.’”).
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C. The Call for Experts as a Response to Legitimacy Concerns
This legitimacy-protective dynamic that leads courts to prefer
quasi-empirical demonstrations of discriminatory intent via the comparator
heuristic also helps explain why scholars have stepped up the call for expert
testimony in employment discrimination claims. Experts, like comparative
data, enable courts to avoid the appearance of engaging in the arguably
sociological task of discerning identity discrimination.226
In part, experts may be useful within the comparator framework to expand
courts’ sense of which comparisons could be probative. Charles Sullivan, for
example, argues that courts need help with the “real question” of “when the
putative comparator is similar enough to justify the inference” of
discrimination.227 He suggests that experts can establish the “standard of care”
against which an employer’s conduct can be measured.228 For Minna Kotkin,
who documents courts’ difficulty observing discrimination when a
discrimination claim rests on multiple grounds, experts are likewise the key to
expanding courts’ understanding of how stereotypes operate and their
conception of appropriate comparators.229
The centrality of experts to theories that advocate noncomparative methods
for observing discrimination similarly can be understood as responding to, or
at least reflecting sensitivity to, the judicial-legitimacy concerns just described.
The implicit bias literature, for example, highlights the ways in which experts
can document the presence of implicit identity-related biases and the effects of
those biases on workplace decisions.230 If carried out by experts, this approach

226.

227.
228.
229.
230.

Still, courts must engage in a potentially sociological assessment when evaluating the
admissibility of testimony by sociologists, cognitive psychologists, and other experts on
discrimination under the standard set out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993). Daubert requires federal courts to screen expert testimony for “scientific validity”
to ensure reliability and relevance. Id. at 594-95. Some have suggested that Daubert has
presented a particular hurdle for expert testimony in discrimination cases. See Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil
Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 551-55 (2010) (discussing
scholarship addressing the effect of Daubert on the admission of expert testimony in
discrimination cases and observing that Daubert, together with summary judgment
practices, may be part of a “lethal combination” that disadvantages plaintiffs in civil rights
and employment discrimination cases).
Sullivan, supra note 3, at 223.
Id. at 237.
Kotkin, supra note 15, at 1449, 1495-97.
For recent discussion and review of implicit bias research in the social sciences, see, for
example, Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005); Jerry Kang &
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to identifying discriminatory intent that is otherwise not readily observable can
have the appearance of objectivity and, relatedly, of being driven by factors
other than the influence of the court’s subjective preferences.
The legitimacy concerns also help explain why, even if a plurality of the
Supreme Court dismissed the expert testimony regarding sex stereotyping at
Price Waterhouse as “icing on the cake,” those litigating the case had thought
the testimony might be helpful. If the Court had not found the link between
the statements made and the partnership denial to Ann Hopkins to be so
noncontroversial, then there would have been little, other than the Court’s own
judgments, to confirm the link between the statements and the protected
characteristic of sex. In this light, the expert testimony in the case can be seen
as a quasi-empirical source to verify or even compel that judgment.
This move to locate determinations about discriminatory intent in experts
can be characterized as simply shifting the legitimacy debate from the
observation of discrimination to the treatment of expert testimony, where the
debate is similarly fraught.231 Moreover, the increased focus on experts (with
their attendant high costs)232 risks exacerbating existing resource imbalances
between plaintiffs and defendants, making the move difficult in all but class
actions and unusually high-value discrimination cases. Still, conceptually at
least, the shift may be just enough to overcome the legitimacy concerns to
which courts are so vulnerable. Justice Scalia has written, in the sexual
harassment context, that “common sense” and “an appropriate sensitivity to
social context” is all that is necessary to discern discriminatory intent.233 But
where there is no easy agreement about how best to understand the social
context, courts again become vulnerable to charges of imposing their own
preferences on a workplace if there is no extrajudicial source that can be said to
have compelled their observation of discrimination.234

231.

Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1071 (2006); and Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral
Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 997 (2006). The Court has long recognized that these biases can result in cognizable
discrimination. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (acknowledging
“the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices” in employment). My focus here is
on how courts can come to see the operation of these stereotypes and prejudices.
See supra note 226.

232.

Cf. Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 177 (2010) (noting
the significant cost of expert testimony).

233.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
This is not to suggest that expert evidence will always be accepted by courts as sufficient or
decisive to establish the presence of discriminatory intent, but instead only that the expert
testimony enables courts to invoke an external source when drawing the link between the

234.
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D. Legitimacy Concerns and the Viability of Second-Generation Discrimination
Theories
These legitimacy concerns appear to present a particular hurdle for
second-generation discrimination theories because, ordinarily, there are no
comparators for intersectional, identity performance, or structural claims. If
these theories are to translate into practice, their success will depend on eliding
the comparator heuristic and finding a different means of exposing the
discrimination at issue, such as the contextual approach of the stereotyping and
harassment cases.
Although relatively few second-generation theories have succeeded in
making this move to contextual analysis or in finding an alternate
methodology, “family responsibilities discrimination” theory has had notable
success in gaining doctrinal traction and may offer valuable lessons.235 The
theory, known as FRD, is concerned with the ways in which employees,
particularly women, face barriers in the workplace associated with their
parenting or other caregiving responsibilities.236 Often employees who suffer
adverse action related to their family responsibilities cannot show
discrimination through a comparator either because there are no similarly
situated coworkers or because the potential comparators in a workplace are all
women or otherwise share the same protected trait.

challenged conduct and the protected characteristic. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that expert testimony about sex
stereotyping at Price Waterhouse would not have been enough to give rise to inference of
discriminatory intent).
235.

See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities
Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J.
1311, 1357 (2008) (stating that FRD lawsuits have “cemented that plaintiffs in Title VII
disparate treatment cases may show [family responsibilities] discrimination even when they
lack a comparator”); see also Catherine Albiston et al., Ten Lessons for Practitioners About
Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1285 (2008).

236.

Joan Williams and Stephanie Bornstein have defined family responsibilities discrimination
as “discrimination against employees based on their responsibilities to care for family
members,” which includes “pregnancy discrimination, discrimination against mothers and
fathers, and discrimination against workers with other family caregiving responsibilities.”
Williams & Bornstein, supra note 235, at 1313. They have observed that “[w]hile FRD most
commonly occurs against pregnant women and mothers of young children, it can also affect
fathers who wish to take on more than a nominal role in family caregiving and employees
who care for aging parents or ill or disabled partners.” Id. For additional discussion of FRD,
see JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT 101-10 (2000); and JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT,
Introduction to WORKLIFE LAW’S GUIDE TO FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION
(2006).
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Rather than try to work from within the comparator heuristic, advocates
for recognition of FRD worked around it and, centrally, engaged experts (as
well as popular culture) to ease courts’ way into seeing the link between
employers’ skepticism of workers with family responsibilities and the protected
characteristic of sex. Social scientists have been particularly important to this
effort, as they have documented “an underlying schema that assumes a lack of
competence and commitment when women are viewed through the lens of
motherhood and housework.”237 These data, supplemented by additional
research, do the work of linking maternal stereotypes to discriminatory intent.
Perhaps responding to Geduldig and Gilbert, where the Court was unable to
bring itself to see the pregnancy-sex connection, FRD advocates effectively
relocated the task of observing discriminatory intent from the courts to expert
social scientists.
FRD recognition advocates have sought to establish the link between
employers’ adverse treatment of parents and sexism in the popular culture as
well, so that the link between an employer’s skepticism toward a new mother’s
work ethic and sex discrimination can be seen easily and without any special
training.238 Thus, when these advocates celebrate that courts have accepted
non-comparator-based FRD claims, we can understand this success as deriving
in part from judicial confidence in public acceptance of the caregiver-sex
discrimination link because public acceptance minimizes the risk that courts
will appear to be meddling unduly in employer freedom or imposing their
subjective views of discrimination.239

237.
238.

239.
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Williams & Bornstein, supra note 235, at 1327.
Id. at 1314 (describing the issue of caregiver discrimination as one that “has ‘arrived’ in the
public consciousness”).
In a more limited way, discrimination claims related to gender identity and performance
also have begun to gain traction. Compare Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C.
2007) (refusing to dismiss a sex discrimination claim against the Library of Congress, which
withdrew a job offer it had made to a military specialist upon learning she was transgender),
with Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting a sex discrimination
claim brought by an airline pilot who was fired after the airline learned she was
transgender). Some of the reasons for the more recent claims’ success relate to judicial
perceptions about the fixed nature of sex in transgender individuals, consistent with the
legitimacy concerns regarding identity described earlier. But others, more relevant to the
inquiry here, derive from the sex stereotyping in these cases, which is as blatant and
relatively easy to recognize as the stereotyping in Price Waterhouse.

discrimination by comparison

By contrast, consider the poor track record of challenges to sex-based dress
and grooming codes as discriminatory.240 In these situations, the underlying
theoretical claim is that an employer’s insistence on having men and women
groom and dress themselves differently is not materially different from firstgeneration-style sex-based classified advertisements or blanket refusals to hire
women; in both, the employer impermissibly polices gender norms.241 Yet
courts regularly do not see the sex-based distinction as discriminatory, in part
because of the way in which they apply a comparator analysis to these cases.242
The legitimacy concerns can help illuminate why comparators are so
difficult to escape in this context. In the view of most courts to have addressed
these challenges, the link between the sex-based rules and discriminatory
intent is not nearly as “obvious” or easy as in the case of sexual harassment or
sex stereotyping. Even relative to FRD, courts do not see evidence that the
public imagination considers grooming codes to be obviously discriminatory.
Nor is there a wealth of social science on which courts can rely, as there is for
FRD, to do the work of establishing that these grooming codes embody sexbased stereotypes or otherwise to illuminate and verify that sex-based
discriminatory intent is embedded in the codes.

240.

241.

242.

See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a sex
discrimination challenge to a casino grooming code that imposed different requirements on
men and women); cf. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004)
(affirming summary judgment for an employer where an employee alleged that a “no facial
jewelry” policy constituted religious discrimination); Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No.
7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *5-6 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008) (finding no merit to
the plaintiff’s allegation that a grooming policy that prohibited dreadlocks and cornrows
constituted race discrimination against African-American employees). But see Tamimi v.
Howard Johnson Co., 807 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming a judgment in favor of an
employee who alleged sex discrimination over a dress code that required female employees
to wear makeup and lipstick).
For a discussion of grooming standards and gender norms, see Devon Carbado et al.,
Foreword: Making Makeup Matter, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2007). Carbado et al.
state that “grooming standards can (but needn’t always) function to regulate and give
content to our identities.” Id. at 2; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
(sustaining a first-generation-type challenge to the exclusion of women from the Virginia
Military Academy).
Apart from the comparator issue, some courts have treated dress and grooming codes, as
opposed to other employer conduct, as falling more broadly within an employer’s discretion
and, therefore, as less susceptible to restriction via Title VII and other antidiscrimination
measures. See Jennifer L. Levi, Misapplying Equality Theories: Dress Codes at Work, 19 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 353, 353-55 (2008) (“[T]he typical dress code that simply distinguishes the
appearance of men and women in the workplace has been found to be unobjectionable by
courts.”); id. at 355 n.4 (citing cases).
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Because the link between sex-based grooming codes and impermissible
stereotyping does not fall within Price Waterhouse’s “no special training”
standard, some other methodology is needed to review the discrimination
allegation, and courts most often funnel these cases through what amounts to a
comparator analysis. As the Ninth Circuit found, for example, when sustaining
a casino’s extensive dress code that included different makeup, hair, and nail
care requirements for men and women, “[t]he only evidence in the record to
support the stereotyping claim is [the plaintiff’s] own subjective reaction to the
makeup requirement.”243 The court contrasted the employee’s claim in that
case with cases in which, it suggested, the link between a dress code and
discrimination would be easier to find, such as where a dress code “tend[ed] to
stereotype women as sex objects” or invite sexual harassment.244 Given courts’
interest in avoiding sociological judgments about identity discrimination that
infringe on employer freedom, it is not surprising that where the court did not
find “clear” stereotyping and where a comparison did not produce a striking
difference in the treatment of men and women,245 the court did not find
discrimination because of sex.246
In short, courts’ concerns about navigating between the Scylla of
sociological tasks and the Charybdis of employer autonomy surely account for
some, if not all, of the comparators’ appeal. With their empirical, legalistic cast,
comparators strongly suggest that courts’ findings of impermissible
discrimination are the product of neither an amateur judicial evaluation of
social norms and workplace dynamics nor a court’s arrogant disregard of
employer autonomy. Instead, they are—or, more precisely, have the appearance
of being—compelled simply and cleanly by both the facts and the governing
law.

243.
244.

Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112.
Id.

245.

The dissenters disagreed with this characterization of the policy, finding that the grooming
code’s makeup requirements for women imposed a distinct burden not imposed on men and
that this difference in treatment was “‘because of’ sex” and was “clearly and unambiguously
impermissible under Title VII.” Id. at 1114 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (describing Jespersen’s
evidence as “show[ing] that Harrah’s fired her because she did not comply with a grooming
policy that imposed a facial uniform (full makeup) on only female bartenders”).

246.

Again, the substantive consequence of this application of the comparator heuristic was to
limit the reach of discrimination law and its underlying norms.
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vi. prospects for change
Assuming that no social scientific advance will render obsolete the need for
judicial inquiries into discriminatory motive and that courts will retain their
sensitivity to the legitimacy concerns just described, this Part suggests several
possibilities for expanding courts’ methodological repertoire for observing
discrimination in light of comparators’ costly deficiencies. Although full
development and evaluation of alternate approaches is beyond this Article’s
scope, the suggestions below aim to counter the comparator demand’s
flattening effect on discrimination law and norms in both first- and secondgeneration theories and cases while also taking account of both judiciallegitimacy and accountability concerns.247
Setting aside strategies for enlarging the set of acts and statements that are
widely understood to expose discriminatory intent,248 potential means for
expanding the set of approaches used to observe discrimination range from
tweaks to the current comparator regime to more expansive frameworks. The
latter have the benefit of allowing more nuanced review, but they also bear the
weakness, in some cases, of providing less guidance and less protection to
courts concerned about their legitimacy. Ultimately, I argue that a move
toward applying the contextual analysis that is already familiar from the
stereotyping and harassment jurisprudence will best address both the
legitimacy concerns to which comparators respond and the accountability flaws
embedded in that methodological choice—with the additional benefit of
restoring a less formalistic, more substantive treatment of discrimination law
and norms.

247.

Although the focus here is on developing options that might enable greater judicial
recognition of diverse forms of discrimination, it is also possible that, again recalling Fuller,
litigation and adjudication are simply not well-suited to resolving certain kinds of complex
suits, including those that are the focus of second-generation theorizing. See supra notes
25-28 and accompanying text. Legislative and policy advocacy as well as collaborative efforts
with employers, public accommodation operators, and others may ultimately be more
effective in eliminating barriers related to protected (and other) traits. However, because the
primary focus of this Article is on what courts can do, and because many of the extralitigation efforts just described operate in the shadow of doctrine, the alternate analytic
approaches here warrant consideration, even if all they do is enhance the possibilities for
success of the nonlitigation strategies.

248.

The movement to have FRD recognized provides a strategic model worthy of consideration
for these kinds of efforts because of its combined focus on developing social science and
establishing understanding of the link between family responsibilities and sex
discrimination in the public’s mind.
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A. Involving Experts in Setting Comparators’ Contours
A first option would be to accept the comparator methodology’s dominance
but expand the conception of an appropriate comparator. As noted earlier, the
Court itself rejected a formulation demanding that a comparison produce a
result that “virtually . . . jump[s] off the page and slap[s] you in the face”
before a finding of discrimination can be made.249 Beyond that, the suggestions
of Kotkin and Sullivan that experts be used to establish reasonable comparators
despite differences in jobs, supervisors, or even employers could prove helpful
in enabling more employees to identify adequate comparators.250 By recasting
the selection of comparators as a determination involving facts subject to
expert analysis and verification, rather than as a matter turning exclusively on
the judgment of the court, it might be possible to broaden the
conceptualization of comparators while attending to the legitimacy constraints
in this area.
For first-generation theories, this expansion would almost certainly be
helpful in mitigating the comparator heuristic’s barrier-like effects. The
broader the pool, the more likely an employee will be able to identify a
colleague who is similarly situated but for the protected characteristic.
The benefit flowing from the sheer increase in numbers of potential
comparators would be much more limited for second-generation
intersectionality claims, however. Recall that the difficulty in these cases does
not lie, primarily, in finding a comparator. Instead, when an individual appears
anomalous amidst the comparator pool because of his or her particular
combination of traits, courts tend to be skeptical—even with comparators—
that discrimination, as opposed to a quirk particular to that individual,
motivated the employer’s adverse action.251
For identity-performance-based suits, broadening the pool of comparators
would likewise be unavailing. For example, returning to Carbado and Gulati’s
example of the fifth black woman, a broader comparator pool would not, in
itself, help that employee show that her race (rather than other factors related
to her personal presentation) was the basis for the adverse treatment. Even
with a broad pool, the employer could still produce the four other black women
whom it promoted to strengthen its argument that it had legitimate,
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Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456-57 (2006) (quoting Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
129 F. App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2005)).
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See supra, notes 227-229 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. A broader comparator pool might possibly
enable a plaintiff to invoke systemic evidence of discrimination by identifying a greater
number of similar coworkers who have suffered adverse action from the employer.
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nondiscriminatory reasons for denying promotion to the fifth black woman.
With the benefit of a broader comparator pool, the fifth black woman could
potentially identify a non-black woman who had a similar style but received a
promotion, but as a practical matter it is difficult to imagine this sort of
comparison-based claim succeeding. Even if the employee could find a
comparator, employers could be counted on to undermine the broader
comparator pool as insufficiently attuned to salient differences in workplace
cultures that are relevant to consideration of employees’ personal style.
For second-generation claims based on structural discrimination, where
workplace patterns make discrimination difficult to observe and trace,
expanding the size of the comparator pool would seem to be of marginal
assistance, at best. Having more employees in the mix could conceivably help
illuminate the effects of the discrimination that is masked within employee
interactions. But as much of the structurally focused literature makes clear, the
structures and relationships within workplaces that facilitate and exacerbate
diffuse and subtle discrimination will still escape observation within a
comparator framework.
B. Considering Hypothetical Comparators
A related possibility would be to expand the current comparator-based
approaches by allowing for hypothetical comparators as well as actual
comparators.252 This approach has been embraced in England, for example,
where the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 “permits a comparison to be drawn
between the way in which a woman is treated and the way in which a
‘hypothetical male’ would have been treated.”253 The European Union has
likewise embraced the value of the hypothetical comparator through its
discrimination-related directives, which provide that discrimination can be
found “where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or
would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic

252.

Even this proposal would move beyond the discrimination theory advanced by Justice
Thomas in Olmstead, which restricts the recognition of discrimination to situations in which
actual differences of treatment between actual employees can be documented.
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See Sandra Fredman, Reforming Equal Pay Laws, 37 INDUS. L.J. 193, 200 (2008); see also Iain
Steele, Note, Beyond Equal Pay?, 37 INDUS. L.J. 119 (2008) (recognizing the value of a
hypothetical male comparator for a woman bringing a claim under the Sex Discrimination
Act of 1975).
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origin.”254 As one commentator has observed, “Clearly, the comparator need
not ‘exist’; establishment of the probability of ‘his’ or ‘her’ better treatment will
be enough.”255
This shift would enhance even further the benefits that flow from
broadening the actual comparator pool, at least for first-generation cases, by
providing more opportunities to produce a discrimination-exposing
comparison. Second-generation cases, by contrast, would experience less gain
from this change for the same reasons that gains from enlarging the set of
actual comparators would be limited.
The potential problem is that the move to a hypothetical comparator may
tread more closely on judicial-legitimacy concerns than an approach that
expands the scope of “real” comparators because it overtly acknowledges the
court’s work in seeing discrimination rather than simply in “finding”
discrimination in the facts presented. Yet there may be ways around this
difficulty. As Sandra Fredman observed with respect to the United Kingdom’s
equal pay laws, “[T]here is a well-developed methodology for determining
what a hypothetical male would have been paid, using either a proportionate
value method or a proxy method.”256 Thus, this type of expert-driven, databased portrait of the hypothetical comparator could conceivably fit neatly with
the judicial-legitimacy concerns in this area.
However, while either legislative commitments or statistical analysis might
work in the equal pay context, where job criteria and pay ranges are arguably
susceptible to quantification and comparison,257 hypothesizing a comparison to
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Council Directive 2000/43/EC, art. 2, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 24 (emphasis added); see also
Council Directive 2006/54/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 204) 23; Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000
O.J. (L 303) 16.
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Elisabeth Holzleithner, Mainstreaming Equality: Dis/Entangling Grounds of Discrimination, 14
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 927, 934 (2005). For additional discussion of the use and
limitations of comparators in Australia, Canada, and Europe, see generally Aileen
McColgan, Cracking the Comparator Problem: Discrimination, “Equal” Treatment and the Role
of Comparisons, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 650 (2006), which collects and analyzes cases
from European supranational and domestic courts that address the use of comparators;
Sophia Reibetanz Moreau, Equality Rights and the Relevance of Comparator Groups, 5 J.L. &
EQUAL. 81 (2006), which analyzes the Canadian Supreme Court’s use of comparators; and
Belinda Smith, From Wardley to Purvis—How Far Has Australian Anti-Discrimination Law
Come in 30 Years?, 21 AUSTL. J. LAB. L. 3 (2008), which critiques the High Court of
Australia’s constrained use of hypothetical comparators.
Fredman, supra note 253, at 201.
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refused to apply Gunther analysis where a comparable worth case “involves a subjective
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prove the discriminatory treatment of a corporate executive or a group of plant
workers where there are no actual comparators will not have that factual,
legitimacy-protecting cast. Imagine, for example, that a court faced with a
discrimination claim by the only African American senior executive at a bank
was asked to hypothesize a comparator to assess the adverse treatment that had
been alleged. While a court might be willing to stretch and consider an expert’s
analysis of actually comparable positions and employees in the industry, the
creation of a purely hypothetical comparator, even if by an expert, arguably
leaves a court with little to show that it has observed trait-based discrimination
rather than simply bad, but permissible, treatment.
Alternately, a hypothetical comparator might elide these concerns if
legislative bodies were to provide an “elaboration . . . of criteria of assessment,”
as the European Court of Justice has suggested.258 Courts could then point to
these bodies, rather than their own views, as driving the comparison. Yet
again, while this could conceivably work in the equal pay area (though the
comparable worth movement’s experience suggests that this would not be
feasible in the United States),259 a general statement of acceptable workplace
behavior would be exceedingly difficult to conceptualize in a way that would
capture discriminatory conduct but not workplace behavior that is offensive
but permissible. Even if one could be created, it would face serious challenges
from extant political and jurisprudential commitments to employer discretion
in workplace governance.
C. Moving Beyond Comparators
The discrimination case law and literature also contain the seeds of
methodologies that could displace or supplement comparators as the primary
heuristic for locating and evaluating discrimination and, in doing so, alleviate
the effects of comparators’ limitations on both first- and second-generation
cases. This section looks first to experts and then to contextual analysis as the
methodological alternatives most likely to succeed because of their sensitivity
to the legitimacy and accountability concerns set out above.

assessment of different positions with different duties” (citing EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1333 (N.D. Ill. 1986))). See generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS
AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
258.
259.

See Case 129/79, Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, 1980 E.C.R. 1275, 1289.
See supra note 257.
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The value of experts, not just to expand conceptions of comparators but to
serve, themselves, as a lens for observing discriminatory intent emerges directly
from the second-generation scholarship. Both the implicit bias and structural
discrimination literature show that expert analysis can aid courts in seeing
which particular structures may foster discrimination.260
The difficulty with experts, relative to the legitimacy concerns, comes in
drawing the link from the insights of the implicit bias and structurally focused
literatures to the dynamics of a specific workplace and the adverse treatment of
a particular employee.261 Although this can be done, methods for seeing
discrimination are likely to be more attractive to courts to the extent that the
experts, rather than the court, appear to be illuminating the discrimination
within the workplace at issue.
Yet another possibility—and the one that I advocate most strongly here—
would be simply to put comparison in its place as one technique among many
for observing discrimination rather than to view it as the technique that must
be used before discrimination can be seen.262 This change would also move
contextual evaluation from its confined role in stereotyping and harassment
cases to a new status as a legitimate analytic option in all cases. Even in its
simplicity, this type of frame-shift in the way in which we see discrimination
cases could be transformative in diminishing some of the worst offenses of the
comparator paradigm. It would do so by more closely matching the
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See supra note 230; see also William T. Bielby, Can I Get a Witness? Challenges of Using Expert
Testimony on Cognitive Bias in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 377 (2003).
If the research showing the general pervasiveness of implicit bias were accepted as sufficient
to show discrimination in a specific case, then anyone with a trait that is the subject of an
implicit bias in a particular context would conceivably be able to prevail on a discrimination
claim. The vast potential reach of this type of reliance on experts would inevitably produce
its own powerful legitimacy-threatening concerns related to judicial overregulation of the
workplace. These would be separate from questions about whether employers should be
held accountable for acting on biases about which they are unaware. See Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477,
479 (2007) (responding to the critique of implicit bias evidence as scientifically invalid and
noting that “the case for using the law to respond to the problem of implicit bias remains
strong”); Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine,
New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999) (maintaining that it is well settled that discrimination
law can and should respond to subtle forms of discrimination, including those exposed by
implicit bias research); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1132-33
(1999) (arguing against employer liability for “unconscious disparate treatment” because
“employers have little effective control over unconscious bias”); cf. Nagareda, supra note 26,
at 156-61 (discussing critiques of implicit bias and structural discrimination theories in the
context of evaluating discrimination class actions).
This would be outside the context of harassment and stereotyping cases, of course.
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observational tools courts use with both the refinements to theory that have
taken place in recent decades and our expanded knowledge of the dynamics of
discrimination.
Indeed, if comparators are properly understood to be one among a set of
imperfect methodological choices for seeing discrimination, courts’ cordoning
off “stray” remarks from consideration, rather than looking holistically at all
incidents in the work environment as they do in harassment and stereotyping
cases, no longer seems so sensible (if it ever did).263 In short, a contextual
approach would free courts from the artificial blinders imposed by the
comparator jurisprudence that short-circuit the analysis of discrimination
claims and produce constricted outcomes without explanation or justification.
This move would obviously be beneficial for first-generation cases because
it would expand the means by which employees could seek to shed light on
discriminatory intent. Discrimination claimants would no longer need to
produce a comparable coworker to overcome the prima facie threshold; nor
would comparators be seen as the gold standard for proving discriminatory
intent. Instead, a picture of the entire work environment, including statements
by supervisors and coworkers, the demographics of the firm and the
surrounding workforce, and the dynamics of the relationship between the
employee and other relevant employees would all be appropriately considered
by courts deciding whether to allow an employee to proceed to trial.
For second-generation claims, an escape from the comparator demand
similarly could prove invaluable by enabling exposure of the nuanced,
contextually rooted, and complex forms of discrimination not reached by firstgeneration theories and foreclosed by a demand for comparators. As would be
true for first-generation cases, the removal of the comparator demand as part
of the prima facie case, or even as an essential part of the proof of pretext,
would enable plaintiffs to turn to other sources to shed light on the
discriminatory work environment. Again, comments and acts by other
employees, firm demographics, and firm policies, among other aspects of
workplace life and governance, could all be deemed worthy of consideration in
deciding whether to allow a discrimination claim to proceed. Employers who
single out some members of a protected class for adverse treatment could no
longer immunize themselves solely on the ground that others with similar
characteristics had not been similarly harmed. In other words, releasing the
comparator’s grip on discrimination analysis reopens the possibility that
discrimination jurisprudence could develop in ways that recognize more than
just the most formalistic and easily legible violations of discrimination laws.
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See supra Part IV.
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A skeptic might object that context-based methodology should be used
sparingly, just as heightened scrutiny of identity-based classifications is
limited. On this view, while we can be reasonably sure that impermissible bias
is at work where there has been harassment or stereotyping, just as we are
willing to suspect similar bias in the use of certain classifications,264 other
situations will not give us the same basis to doubt the employer’s actions. The
concern, from this perspective, would be that if we enable an employee to
trigger a contextual inquiry outside the presence of harassment or stereotyping
remarks (as in a challenge to a breastfeeding ban, for example), courts would
lack the constraints necessary to prevent them from unduly infringing
employer freedom.265
The analogy is misplaced, however, because a context-focused analysis of a
discrimination claim is concerned with what types of evidence will be
considered; it does not come with a heightened-scrutiny-style presumption
that the employer has acted impermissibly. Indeed, as discussed earlier, even
the presence of overtly sexualized or racialized comments or acts does not
necessarily produce an inference of discriminatory intent related to an
employee’s protected characteristic.266 There is no reason to think that a shift
to a contextual analysis in cases without stereotyping or harassment claims will
alleviate the doctrine’s burden on the plaintiff to show that the conduct at issue
is both serious and linked to the employee’s protected characteristic(s). That is,
in a case where an employee lacks a comparator but can point to an adverse
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For extended discussion about the relationship between heightened scrutiny and rational
basis review in the equal protection context, see, for example, Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality
Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004). For discussion of context-sensitive review in
other constitutional contexts, see, for example, Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
629 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), which
discusses context-sensitivity with respect to standards for reviewing Establishment Clause
violations as well as “many [other] standards in constitutional law”; and Neil S. Siegel,
Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1655
n.106 (2006), which describes the “context-sensitive, rough balancing of incommensurable
values that is typical of doctrinal analysis in constitutional law.”
Extending the analogy, the skeptic might also argue that a comparator’s presence gives the
court some reason, though not as much as in the case of harassment or stereotyping, to be
suspicious of the workplace conduct at issue. Thus the presence of a comparator, on this
view, could reasonably trigger something similar to a strong form of rational basis review.
Without harassment, stereotyping, or a near-identical comparator, the skeptic would argue
that courts should have no reason to be suspicious and, therefore, no reason to subject the
employer’s actions to the relatively more searching contextual assessment. Indeed, we could
characterize the approach courts take in the no-comparator cases as analogous to the
weakest form of rational basis review, which gives the employer’s adverse action the
strongest presumption of legitimacy.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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action—for example, some arguably trait-related remarks from coworkers—
and perhaps other circumstances, such as a pattern of exclusion from
important events, the discrimination claim will not gain a free pass under a
contextual review. Instead, it will merely, but importantly, have a chance to be
heard, where under a comparator framework, it would be foreclosed from the
outset.
Of course, a move like this, which broadens the pool of potentially
successful discrimination cases, has certain costs. With more cases surviving
into later stages of litigation, employers are likely to pay employees more, and
perhaps more quickly, to settle cases. Courts, too, will face greater burdens to
the extent they are charged with overseeing a potential growth in longerlasting litigation.267 But, I would argue, these costs are more than matched by
the benefit of having open jurisprudential discussion and debate about the
proper reach of discrimination doctrine. This is not to say that courts (or
employers) would easily embrace the kinds of complex, or even firstgeneration, discrimination cases that currently lose because the plaintiff lacks a
comparator. But under the current comparator regime, these cases, and the
theories on which they rely, do not even get to the point of having a
meaningful hearing absent a comparator. A move to a contextual evaluation
would open the possibility of conversation and perhaps lead to refinement of
the jurisprudence.
Further, if we admit that the way in which we see discriminatory intent—in
harassment and stereotyping cases as well as cases with comparators—rests on
judicial judgment calls aided by whatever heuristics have been deployed, rather
than being factually or legally compelled, then maintaining such different
approaches begins to make less sense. A move toward contextualized
assessment of all types of workplace rules starts to seem both more sensible
and less troubling.
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For plaintiffs, by contrast, the cost of a move to a context-focused regime would be virtually
nil. If the production of a comparator were enough, on its own, to enable an employee to
prevail, we might be concerned that employers would seek to invoke a contextual analysis to
impede potentially successful comparator-based claims. But the comparator alone does not
secure victory for the employee; instead, at most, the employee wins the right to survive
summary judgment and bring his or her case to a jury. A context-focused analysis simply
opens room for the employee to produce additional evidence of discrimination, which at
most could supplement, but could not undermine, whatever observations about
discrimination a court would make via a comparator.
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conclusion
Judicial concerns about sociological inquiries and undue incursions into
employer discretion, as well as comparators’ intuitive appeal as a means for
observing discriminatory intent, will no doubt enable the comparator
methodology to retain a central place in discrimination jurisprudence. Still, the
methodology’s embedded expectation that identities are simple and that
workers are easily comparable belies contemporary understandings of both
identity and the modern workforce. Consequently, the comparator demand has
foreclosed most discrimination claims and, further, shrunk the very idea of
discrimination, both truncating traditional discrimination jurisprudence and all
but guaranteeing that second-generation discrimination theories will not
translate into law.
Because comparators are, in this sense, so mismatched to their task of
revealing trait-based discrimination, it is time to recognize them as but one
among several imperfect methodologies rather than as foundational to
discrimination itself. By dethroning comparators in this way and incorporating
the contextual methodology used to observe discrimination in harassment and
stereotyping cases, we may yet be able to diminish the damage caused by their
troubling stranglehold over American discrimination law and theory.
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